

Alicia Cabezudo

CURRICULUM VITAE

A. PERSONAL DATA

NAME: ALICIA CABEZUDO

BIRTH DATE: 10 - 22 – 1947

PLACE: Rosario, Argentina

NATIONALITY: Italian

PASSPORT: 371880 B

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B. GRADUATE STUDIES:

Major in History. National University of Rosario, Argentina. (1976)

Master Grade

Specialist Professor for the teaching of Human Rights, Peace and International Cooperation. Geneva, Switzerland. (1989)

Degree in Spanish Studies, specialty: History. University of Barcelona, Spain. (1980)

Ph D. THESIS:

“PROJECT ON EDUCATION FOR PEACE, LIFE AND DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS”. Theoretical basis. Thematic axis. Didactic proposal. University of Buenos Aires, Argentina . (1990) .

D. LANGUAGE SKILLS:

ENGLISH – FRENCH – SPANISH: speaks, writes and translates.

ITALIAN - PORTUGUESE: understands and translates

Teachers Training

School for Training Teachers Normal N° 1 “Dr. Nicolas Avellaneda”:

Specialist Professor in Teachers Training School for Primary School Level

- Professor at the Regional Seminar. Rosario, Argentina (1995 – 2003)

- Professor in Social Sciences Area. Rosario, Argentina (1989 – 2003)

- Practice Workshop in Social Sciences. Rosario, Argentina (1989 – 2003)

Superior Institute for Training Teachers N° 16 “Dr. Bernardo Houssay”:

- Professor in Social Sciences Area. Rosario, Argentina (1990 – 2003)

National Superior Institute for Training Teachers “ Olga Cosettini”:

- Civic Education Professor. Rosario, Argentina (1988 – 2005)

Undergraduate UNIVERSITY LEVEL:

- Professor Chief of Practice Work in Teachers Training Area: Social Sciences and History. Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Rosario National University, Argentina (1986 - present)

POST GRADUATE LEVEL:

- Transcend Peace University. Faculty Member. Course: Learning Peace Culture. With Magnus Haavelsrud and Cathrine Hoopers. Course 2006.

- Visiting Professor United Nation University of Peace San Jose, Costa Rica. Master in Peace Education. Course 2005 – 2006 / Course 2006 – 2007

Professor at International Master Program Rotary Foundation Program

Education for Peace and International Relationship. University of El Salvador Buenos Aires, Argentina. From Course 2006 beginning August 2006.

- Adjunct Professor in the Peace Program, Teachers College, Columbia University. New York City, USA. (September 2000- September 2001)

- Professor in Teaching Area, member of the Pedagogy Consultant Council, Faculty of Law, Rosario National University, Argentina (1991 – 1999)

- Professor Teaching Area, Social Sciences, Post- graduate Seminar. Faculty of Law, Rosario National University, Argentina (1992 – 1999)

- Attached Professor to the Teaching Area, Faculty of Law, Rosario National University, Argentina (1986 –1999)

- Professor Chief of Practice Work in the area of Education and Human Rights in the Free Human Rights Studies, Faculty of Philosophy and Literature, Buenos Aires National University. Buenos Aires, Argentina (1995 -2000)

- Coordinator of Education Projects at the Research Studies in Human Rights Center, Faculty of Law, Rosario National University. Rosario, Argentina (1993 – 1999)

POSITIONS – MEMBERSHIP

Coordinator of the Global Campaign for Peace Education in Latin America. HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE, New York City Headquarters, USA. (September 2006 – 2001)

Education Conveyor of the Advisory Board of Arigatou Foundation. International Program on Interfaith Learning and Ethics Education. Tokyo and Geneva. (2007 – 2004)

Education Conveyor of the Southern Team on the North South Centre of the Council of Europe. Global Education Activities . Lisboa, Portugal (2007 – 2003)

Director of EDUCATING CITIES LATIN AMERICA Regional Office, International Relations Bureau. According to Agreement signed by the Municipalities of Rosario, Argentina and Barcelona, Spain. (1999 - 2005)

IPRA International Peace Research Association. Member of the PEC (Peace Education

Commission) (2002 – present)
 IPRA Foundation. Member of the Advisory Consulting Board. (2002 – present)
 IPRA Member of the Board of Editors of the Peace Education Journal. New York City, USA. (2002 – present)
 International Educational Coordinator of the Disarmament and Peace Project for the UNITED NATIONS. DDA (Disarmament Department Affairs) and the HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE. Headquarters Office: New York City. Work on the field: Albania, Cambodia, Niger and Peru. (September 1st 2001- February 28, 2002)
 Member of the Advisory Board of the Global Campaign for Peace Education..
 HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE, New York City Headquarters, USA. (September 1st 2000-September 1st 2001)
 Coordinator of the Program HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK in Latin America. Headquarters: Austrian Ministry of Education / Interkulturelles Zentrum, Vienna, Austria.(1999 - present)
 Member of the INTERNATIONAL BUREAU DE LA PAIX (IPB) .Latin America Chapter .Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland. (1996 - present)
 Coordinator of LIFE LINK FOUNDATION for South America. Headquarters: Uppsala, Sweden. (1990 - present)
 Coordinator of TEACHERS FOR PEACE for South America. Headquarters: Paris, France. (1990 - present)
 General Coordinator of the MUNICIPAL EDUCATION SERVICE, Secretary of Culture, Municipality of Rosario, Argentina. (1996 - 1993)
 General Coordinator in Rosario of the Project Schools Associated to UNESCO, Paris, France. National Ministry of Education, Secretary of International Cooperation. Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Other MEMBERSHIP in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Member of the Permanent Teachers Training Team for Primary, High School and University Levels in PEACE EDUCATION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS of the following international organizations:
 TRANSCEND PEACE UNIVERSITY – TRANSCEND FACULTY MEMBER
 NORTH SOUTH CENTRE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
 HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE . GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE EDUCATION. NYC, USA.
 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Argentina Section. Headquarters: London, UK.
 SEMINARIO GALLEGO DE EDUCACIÓN PARA LA PAZ. Headquarters: Santiago de Compostela, Spain.
 EDUCATORS FOR PEACE. Headquarters: Montevideo, Uruguay.
 O. E. I. Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura. Headquarters: Madrid, Spain.
 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATING CITIES . Headquarters:

Barcelona town Hall, Department of Education and Culture , Spain.

GRANTS and AIDS

Grants received for working in the Education field:
 January 2006 - 2003 - Member of the International Board for Global Education. North-South Centre of the Council of Europe. Lisboa, Portugal.
 January 2003 – 2004 - Member of the working group on Interfaith Learning and Ethics Education. Education Task Group . Arigatou Foundation. Tokyo – Geneva.
 February 2000: Post Graduate Seminar in Peace Education. Director: Prof. Betty Reardon. Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, USA
 August – November 1999: Course on Forming Multipliers in Human Rights. Workshop on Didactic practices for teaching Human Rights. Human Rights Permanent Assembly / Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina.
 November 1999: Participant in the preparatory meeting for the GLOBAL CAMPAIGN OF PEACE EDUCATION. The Hague Appeal for Peace. New York, USA.
 May 1999: Presentation of the Program EDUCATING CITIES AND PEACE EDUCATION. The Hague Appeal for Peace. The Hague, Netherlands.
 April 1999: Participant and Introduction of the Program “EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN EDUCATING CITY”. Congress on Educating Programs in the Cities. Barcelona, Spain.
 March 1999: Presentation of the Program of Educating Cities Latin America Delegation
 “THE CITY AND THE RIGHTS OF ITS PEOPLE”, VI International Congress of Educating Cities, Jerusalem, Israel.
 March 1999: Invited lecturer Post graduate Seminar Guadalajara University, Mexico. Subject: “THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN EDUCATING CITY”. ITESO University of Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Mexico.
 October 1998: Presentation of the Program “THE CITY AND THE RIGHTS OF ITS PEOPLE” , 1st. European Congress “Human Rights in the Cities”. Barcelona, Spain.
 August 1998: Invited lecturer Seminar “EDUCATION FOR PEACE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS”. University of Vermont, USA.
 April 1998: Course: “DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN EDUCATING CITY”. Organized by Federation of Teachers of Uruguay and Montevideo Municipality. Montevideo, Uruguay.
 December 1997: Presentation of Educating Cities to Porto Alegre and Santa Maria Municipalities. Invited lecturer for courses and workshops in both cities. Porto Alegre and Santa Maria, Brazil.
 November 1996: Invited lecturer to the 1st. International Conference for Peace and

- Conflict Resolution. Subject: "DIDACTIC STRATEGIES IN EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS". Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombia.
- September 1996: Seminar for teachers and university students at the 1st. University Congress of Educating Cities for Peace and Against Social Exclusion. Subject: "EDUCATION FOR PEACE IN METROPOLITAN URBAN CENTERS". Curitiba, Brazil.
- September 1996: Presentation of Educating Cities South America Delegation Program at the IV International Congress of Educating Cities "Arts and Humanities as Agents of Social Change". Chicago, USA.
- August 1996: Invited lecturer to the 2nd. European Congress for Peace. Organized by Teachers for Peace. Subject: "LEARNING OF DIDACTIC TECHNIQUES ON EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS". Oslo, Norway.
- August 1996 – 1995 – 1994 : Training Seminar for Teachers and Students in the Area of Education for International Cooperation and Defense of Human Rights. High school and university levels. Organized by LIFE LINK FOUNDATION. Uppsala, Sweden.
- July 1996 – 1995 : Training for teachers and students for the Austrian Ministry of Education and the Interkulturelles Zentrum. Subject: "EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION". Vienna, Austria.

PUBLICATIONS

Books:

- 2005 La Paz es Posible . Capitulo XV – Education for Peace and Human Rights. Fundacion Cultura de Paz and Ed. Icaria , Madrid, Spain.
- 2005 Education for Democracy at Municipalities . The case of local governments. CIP – Centro de investigaciones para la Paz – Madrid, Spain.
- 2004 . Program on Education for Democracy, Culture of Peace and Human Rights. Instituto Paulo Freire, Sao Paulo, Brazil
- 2002: LEARNING TO ABOLISH WAR. Teaching toward a Culture of Peace. In collaboration with Dr. Betty Reardon. Hague Appeal for Peace, New York, USA.
- August 1999: Prologue to "PEACE EDUCATION FROM THE CONFLICT". Author: Prof. Angel Iglesias Díaz. Publisher: Homo Sapiens.
- August 1998: "STRATEGIES OF CITIZEN'S PARTICIPATION". Publisher: Division of Social Promotion, Municipality of Montevideo, Uruguay.
- June 1998: "ARMENIA: EDUCATING CITY". Development Plan 1998 / 2000. Volume 1. Chapter: Educating Strategies in Armenia. Publisher: Municipality of Armenia, Colombia.
- April 1998: "INNOVATIVE EDUCATING PROJECT". Education for Peace, Defense of Human Rights and the Democratic System. Publisher: Normal No. 1 School, Rosario. Ministry of Education of Santa Fe province.

- July 1997: "MEMORIES". Publication of the 1st. International Congress for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Latin America. Chapter: "Educating Cities and the Problematic of Peace Education", page 54. Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombia.
- January – July 1997: "ROUND ABOUT". Presentation of a project of Education for Peace and Human Rights in Latin America. Activities, proposals. Publisher: Interkulturelle Zentrum, Vienna, Austria.

Newsletters:

- January 2005 – January 1999 - Editor in Chief Cahiers of Educating Cities , International Association of Educating Cities. Barcleona Town Hall, Spain. Rosario Town Hall, Argentina.
- November 1999: "KULTUR IM KONTAKT". Publication of the School Network of Human Rights. Published by Austrian Ministry of Education and Interkulturelles Zentrum. Vienna, Austria.
- October 1999: Program "GIVE PEACE A CHANCE". International Educating Project in the year of Culture of Peace. Educating Cities Latin America, Municipality of Rosario, Argentina.
- October 1999: Publication of the ALPEN - ADRIA ALTERNATIVE Program. Interview to Alicia Cabezudo, Educating Cities. Villach, Austria.
- March 1999: GLOBAL PROGRAM OF CULTURE OF PEACE "ROSARIO AND THE WORLD". International Educating Project for teachers and students interchange. Educating Cities Latin America, Direction of International Relations, Municipality of Rosario, Argentina.
- April 1998: MAGAZINE IN CELEBRATION OF 50 YEARS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Publisher: A.M.S.A.FE, Secretary of Human Rights, Rosario, Argentina. Chapters referring to didactic models and resources for teaching Human Rights.
- March 1998: "THE CITY AND THE RIGHTS OF ITS PEOPLE". Theoretical frame and didactic proposals for Education for Peace and Human Rights in cities. Educating Cities Latin America, Direction of International Relations, Municipality of Rosario, Argentina.

Articles in newspapers and magazines .

- From 1986 till the present publications in latin American newspapers and educational magazines as well as many European magazines on the field of Education, Peace, Democracy and Human Rights. A complete list can be sent with dates, name of the publication and titles. A complete list can be sent on PARTICIPATION in Seminars, Congress and Consultancy Meetings.

Professor Alicia Cabezudo

EDUCATING FOR ETHICAL VALUES AND PEACE

Some Curriculum Ideas /

Professor Alicia Cabezudo
School of Philosophy / Department of Education
University of Rosario, Argentina

Introduction

In the late twentieth century many of the major dilemmas facing our world late to issues leading us to ethical values, peace and conflict: the spiraling arms race and the threat of nuclear holocaust; human rights violations; the gap between rich and poor countries, ecological imbalance, and cultural violence at the interpersonal, community, national and global levels. Such issues inescapability impacts , in varying degrees, on our daily lives and on the consciousness of children at school and out school , including their hopes, aspirations and dreams.

The last decade has witnessed a growing concern that schools should take notice of global problems such as these both at the micro and macro levels. This fact is illustrated by an increasing range of curriculum initiatives in multicultural education, non- sexist education, environmental education, development education, Aboriginal studies, religious education and pastoral care, education for human rights, and future studies.

Overlapping with these other contemporary movements for curriculum innovation has been the development of broadly based peace education and non violent - ethics movement everywhere .

In this context, it is increasingly maintained that the school curriculum and community learnings should provide opportunities for realistic and informed appraisal of contemporary problems of our world without reinforcing negative images of an “inevitable” gloom and doom future. At the same time it is argued that there is a need for the development of inquiry and the reduction of violence, and for greater opportunities in the school curriculum for creative and rational discussion of diverse views on alternative futures.

Like the widened conceptual understandings of health implied in preventative medicine, the concept of peace tighted to Ethics in contemporary peace research literature and peace education is defined broadly rather than narrowly (see Figure 1). Peace is considered conceptually on a variety of scales and levels from the personal to the global.

One of the great traditional words for peace is the Hebrew `shalom`, the Arabic `salam`. It comes from a root meaning `wholeness`. Rather than defining peace negatively, as the interval between wars or outbreaks of physical violence, it is defined in a positive and integrated way. It is taken to denote not only the absence of open hostilities but also the presence of peacemaking processes and conditions likely to ensure a secure, durable peace. It implies a state of well-being and an active process in which justice, equity and respect for basic human rights are maximized and violence, both physical and structural, is minimized.

A broad rather than narrow concept of peace is taken as the basis for discussion here and basically as the upper value for an ethical workd where Peace must prevail over All .




Figure 1: Defining Peace as an Ethical Value

1. The purpose and aims of Ethics Education and Education for Peace

Purpose

Educating shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 26

This paper provides a succinct expression of the purpose of educating for peace as education for a new Ethics and Understanding . It raises important issues about the professional responsibilities of teachers and the role of schools in cultivating global awareness and peace perspectives across the curriculum as well as the important role of non formal education . The principles of the Universal Declaration are given legal force by the International Convention against Discrimination in Education, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The legal standards of Article 26 are reaffirmed in the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child . Principle 10 states that children shall be educated in “ a spirit of understanding, tolerance among people, (and) peace...”

(b) Aims

Educating for Ethics and peace should aim to:

- Help students understand some of the complex processes leading to violence and conflict at the individual, group, national and global levels, and be aware of some of the ways in which these conflicts may be resolved.

- Cultivate attitudes that lead to a preference for constructive and non- violent resolution of conflict.

- Help students develop the personal and social skills necessary to live in harmony with others and to behave in positive and caring ways that respect basic human rights.

- Develop `humane learning communities`, in which students and teachers are encouraged to work together cooperatively to understand and find solutions to significant problems.

2. The objectives of educating for peace as an ethical value

Knowledge.

Knowledge objectives relate to the following concepts:

Conflict

Students should investigate a variety of historical and contemporary conflicts from the personal to the global and should consider attempts to resolve such conflicts. They should also explore ways of resolving such conflict non- violently in everyday life.

Peace

Students should investigate different concepts and examples of peace, both as a state of being and as an active process, on a variety of levels and scales from the personal to the global. They should consider case studies of individuals, groups and organizations working for peace, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

Justice

Students should investigate issues of justice and injustice on various levels- personal, school, local, national, global. They should develop an understanding of the causes of physical violence and the means of creating the conditions of peace. They should consider case studies of individuals, groups and organizations working for justice and observance of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

Power

Students should investigate issues to do with power and ways in which the exercise of power affects people's lives. They should look at case studies of ways in which individual and groups have exercised power over their own lives, and are participating in democratic processes.

Social Change and Continuity

Students should investigate the processes of social change, violent and non- violent. They should understand how societies preserve what is valuable to them and modify what is undesirable.

Gender

Students should investigate issues to do with discrimination based on gender. They should understand the historical background to these issues, examine the ways in which sexism operates against the development of non- violent relationships, and consider options for the future.

Ethnic and Religious Groups

Students should investigate issues to do with discrimination based on ethnicity and diverse religions . They should understand the historical background to these issues, examine the ways in which racism and religious intolerance perpetuates hatreds and violence, and consider options for the future.

Role Models

Students should have direct experience of positive role models of peace making through with teachers and community members and investigation of appropriate case studies.

Ecology

Students should investigate ecological issues at local and global levels. They should understand the historical background to these and consider whether changes are needed in order to live in harmony rather than conflict with the planetary ecosystem.

Interdependence

Students should investigate the impact which the decisions and actions of groups may have at various levels. In this way they can understand the increasing economic environmental and communications interdependence of the people of the Earth.

Futures

Students should investigate a range of alternative futures, both probable and preferable. They should critically explore the implications of various options, and make up their own minds which scenarios and actions are most likely to lead to a less violent, more peaceful and secure world.

Skills

Education for Ethics and Peace should develop in students,

Critical Thinking

Students should be able to approach issues with an open and critical mind and be willing to change their opinions in the light of new evidence and rational argument. They should be able to recognize and challenge bias, indoctrination and propaganda.

Cooperation

Students should be able to appreciate the value of cooperating on shared tasks and be able to work cooperatively with other individuals and groups in order to achieve a common goal.

Empathy

Students should be able to imagine sensitively the view points and feelings of other people, particularly those belonging to groups, cultures and nations other than their own.

Assertiveness

Students should be able to communicate clearly and assertively with others i.e. neither in an aggressive manner which denies the rights of others nor in a passive manner which denies their own rights.

Conflict Resolution

Students should be able to analyze conflicts in an objective and systematic way and be able to suggest a range of solutions to them. Where appropriate they should be able to implement solutions themselves.

Social Literacy

Students should be developing the ability to influence decision-making thoughtfully and constructively, both within their own lives and local community, and also at national and international levels, with a view to building peace.

Values

Education for Ethics and peace should equip a student to analyze, clarify, judge and acquire values in the areas of:

Self- respect

Students should have a sense of their own worth and pride in their own particular social, cultural and family backgrounds different to their own.

Respect for Others

Students should have a sense of worth of others, particularly of those with social, cultural and family backgrounds different to their own.

Global Concern

Students should have a sense of Australian identity which recognizes the essential interdependence of life on planet Earth.

Ecological Concern

Students should have a sense of respect for the natural environment and our overall place in the web of life. They should also have a sense of responsibility for both the local and global environment.

Open- mindedness

Students should be willing to approach different sources of information, people and events, with a critical but open mind.

Vision

Students should be open to, and value, the various dreams and visions of what a better world might look like both in their own community, in other communities and in the world as a whole.

Social Responsibility

Students should value genuinely democratic principles and processes and be ready to work for a more just, secure and peaceful world at local, national and international levels.

3. What is an ethical and peace perspective in the learning process ?

What's distinctive about a peace and ethical perspective in the learning process ? Its distinctiveness lays in the particular importance that teachers and schools implementing this perspective give to areas such as the following:

- fostering international understanding and a sense of global responsibility
- Investigating the causes of conflict and violence and the conditions of peacefulness in individuals, in institutions and in societies.
- Assisting students to develop social literacy skills for dealing constructively with conflict on a variety of scales and levels from the personal to the global.
- Offering a range of learning opportunities within various subject areas for a future dimension, including open- minded enquiry on issues relating to building a more secure, just and sustainable world society.
- Working towards a “unity of learning” between the formal and informal curriculum. Educating ethically for peace is not simply teaching about peace


within particular subject areas. The achievement of reasonable levels of compatibility between the “what” and the “how” of teaching is seen to be of central importance to good classroom practice.

(c)Procedural values

In teaching style, a teacher in a peaceful classroom seeks to incorporate fully, basic, procedural values, such as open-mindedness, fairness, respect for truth and respect for reasoning. It is recognized that open-minded inquiry flourishes best in a peaceful learning environment. Tolerant, warmly supportive, caring, learning environments are just as important as the question of content. A peace perspective relates closely to teaching about and teaching in peace.

(d)Programming and teaching ideas

For teachers and schools to implement a peace perspective is both a challenging and exciting task. Already, positive developments are occurring- at the primary and secondary school levels. Many classroom teachers are pursuing educating for peace objectives in their teaching programs and classrooms activities.



TOWARDS A PEACE and ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE

- Non- sexist policy (reduction of direct and indirect violence based on gender)
- Diverse religious perspectives. (interfaith learnings)
- Multicultural education policy (intercultural awareness and international understanding)
- Multi ethnic education policy (non- racism)
- Environmental education(living in harmony rather than in conflict with our planetary ecosystem)
- Personal development (learning peaceful relationships, conflict resolution skills)
- Student welfare policy (“ humane learning communities”, peaceful classrooms and school ethos)




Figure 2: Towards a peace and ethical perspective in Education .Formal / non-formal .

FORMAL CURRICULUM – Integration of learnings -

Essential interdependence of places and people
Conflict and conflict resolution
The role of international organisations such as the United Nations

The present World
Making Sense of Our World

Justice and human rights
Violence and non-violence
World futures

Social change and social continuity
Examples of some relevant content areas in teaching about peace within existing subjects

Key Issues: How much compatibility is there between what I teach and how I teach? Do I teach both *about* peace and values and *in* peace? Is there “unity of learning” between the formal and non formal curriculum in my classroom (my school)?

FORMAL CURRICULUM

What are my preferred options for a peaceful classroom and peaceful school ethos?

Envy
Greed
Fear
Aggression

Self- Esteem
Learning to Understand Ourselves

Love
Caring
Responsibility

Assumptions
Prejudices

Conflict resolution (Win-win or Win-lose methods? Does my school have a peer mediation program?)

Teaching strategies (What mix is there of cooperative and competitive classroom approaches?)

Learning to live with Others

Global context (is there a “whole school” approach to developing intercultural and international understanding?)

Social literacy

Seminar:

BASIS FOR EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

A proposal to structure Democratic awareness, Culture of Peace and Human Rights in our society.

Organizers:

- ◆ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATING CITIES. Municipality of Barcelona, Spain. LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL OFFICE, International Relations Bureau, Municipality of Rosario, Argentina.
- ◆ INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS FOR PEACE, Paris, France. Area: LATIN AMERICA.
- ◆ INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN OF EDUCATION FOR PEACE, HAGUE APPEAL FOR PEACE, New York, USA. Area: LATIN AMERICA.

Sponsors:

- ◆ SERPAJ ARGENTINA. SERVICIO DE PAZ Y JUSTICIA. (Service of Peace and Justice)
- ◆ FOPAZ ARGENTINA. FORO POR LA PAZ. (Peace Forum)
- ◆ SEMINARIO GALEGO DE EDUCACION PARA LA PAZ (Galician Seminar of Education for Peace), Santiago de Compostela, Spain.
- ◆ PEACE CENTER. Teachers College. Columbia University, USA.
- ◆ SCOUTS ARGENTINA CIVIL ASSOCIATION

Aimed to:

This Seminar/Workshop is open to students from last year of High School and from different universities who are interested in the fundamental principles of Civic Education, Education for a Culture of Peace and Human Rights. The participation of professionals from different spheres of learning interested in these subjects and of members of the Police Force active or retired, with experience in urban areas is also expected.

The objective is to gather a heterogeneous group, of different ages, qualifications and specialties, interested in these subjects essential for the present world, and who are determined to commit themselves to these principles in their every day activities, whether they are in the educative or working field.

Venue. Time schedule

SOCIAL POLICE CLUB ROSARIO, Argentina.

February- March- April 2002 / 2 days per week- 3 hours per day.

Number of class hours theory/workshops: 80 hours (eighty).

Community aimed projects, to be applied through 2002 / 2003.

General structure of the Seminar

The Seminar is structured in three general areas closely linked among them from the first class.

- a) Basis. Theoretical classes and Workshops on Civic Education, Human Rights and Education for Peace. In seminar format and with different teachers.
- b) Practice. Carrying out of practices and projects in the community, educative institutions, churches, NGOs, etc.
- c) Relation with mentors or consultants. Virtual communication with the authors of the suggested reading.

Teachers:

Present: Prof. Gabriel González Suárez
Lic. Carlos del Frade
Lic. Eugenia Ruiz Bry
Prof. Julieta de Zavalía
Prof. Alicia Cabezudo

Special guests: Nobel Prize Laureate Adolfo Pérez Esquivel.
Director and teaching team of “La Aldea”, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Dr. Magnus Haavelsrud, Trondheim University, Norway.

Virtual: Dr. Magnus Haavelsrud (Norway)
Prof. Calo Iglesias (Spain)
Prof. Betty Reardon (USA)

Pedagogical Coordinator: Prof. Alicia Cabezudo

BASIS

Education for Democracy, Culture of Peace and Human Rights implies a pedagogical challenge for institutions, teachers, students, and governments, since national and international reality show exactly different values.

Nowadays, distrust, violence, and aggressiveness tinge the relations among different social actors and different people. These relations are mainly created by the governments of those states where rights are “given” by the economic powers, dominant classes, and representatives of international corporations.

Participatory dialogue, dynamism in the practice and construction of civism, conflict resolution through non violent methods, and the Defense of Justice as a fundamental Human Right are not

recognized as instruments and goals for the process of constructing true Democracy and establishing Social Peace.

Then, it is education by giving priority to these postulates that must offer the possibility of learning, sharing and practice knowledge, and skills for our full human development.

Education must construct mentalities open to change and participation, helping us to work for a better, more just world. Education must also promote solidarity and joint work as a feasible alternative to the urgent problems of today's world.

Education is a unique life long process that makes us aware of our role as dynamic agents of change, and of the social effect we produce in our environment. Human Rights, Justice, Peace, and Equity must be in force for every member of society, and must be part of the overall construction of a cooperating, truly democratic conscience.

This seminar is an instrument... an opportunity... a challenge...

We are all going to reflect and work in this field building roads for Hope, for Transformation, for Cooperation and people's understanding... promoting joint alternatives in the understanding that in this way... may be... DEMOCRACY may have a real chance.

Go ahead, then.

Prof. Alicia Cabezudo
Seminar General Coordinator
Rosario, Argentina. February- May 2002

Objectives of the Seminar:

- To promote effective knowledge of legal standards and existing reality to local, national, and regional levels as regards Participatory Democracy, the Right to Peace, and respect of Human Rights.
- To study the history of progressive development of Humanity in these fields, so as to know about the struggles and success managed by individuals, by different social groups, and by different people as significant achievements in their search for their freedoms and rights.
- To contribute with theoretical instruments about field projects' organization and coordination with the aim to develop a collective conscience about these social values. Thus, to provide the means so as to be able to face the reality of present society characterized by extreme violence, and political authorities indifferent to people's request for dialogue, governmental responsibility, and democratic exercise of power.
- To create critical and participatory consciousness, where individual work changes into open possibilities for collective and lasting social change with better living conditions for everybody.

Didactics units.

Unit I: Introduction

- Theoretical knowledge about law in concepts related to DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, STATE LAW, ANTI- DEMOCRACY. Content. Description of basic components.
Brief perspective of the seek for freedoms and Human Rights through the analysis of historical events. Causes and consequences' analysis. Their influence in the present world.

Unit II: The Nature of Peace

- Definitions, and different concepts. Levels of Peace. Individual, community, national, international Peace. Religious traditions and beliefs. Peace in Political Theory. Peace as an object for research.
- Absence of Peace. Obstacles for Peace. Direct and indirect violence. Injustice. Inequality. Intolerance.
- Concepts of Positive and Negative Peace. Culture of Peace: its reach.

Unit III: The Nature of Human Rights

- The problem of the basis and historical origin of Human Rights. Evolution of the modern concept of Human Rights. Basic characteristics. Analysis. As regards their universality. Theory and criticism.
- The so known "Generations" of Human Rights. Historical and conceptual analysis. It's application in the reality.
- Human Rights classification. Discussion about their legality and legitimacy.

Unit IV: Democracy, Human Rights, and Culture of Peace.

Participatory Democracy as a scope where it is possible to develop a policy for Human Rights and Culture of Peace. Analysis of Latin American reality. The Argentine case. Argentina 2002.

- National and international juridical instruments.
- Mechanisms for the international guarantee of Human Rights.
- Democratic Education for a Culture of Peace and Promotion of Human Rights. National, regional, and international perspective.
- Global campaign for Peace Education, Hague Appeal for Peace: a hope and a challenge.

Unit V: Service projects elaboration

- Theoretical concept of program and projects. Theoretical model to be applied in the community.
- From the theoretical model to the putting into practice of a service project based on Culture of Peace and respect of Human Rights. Basic elements, basis, and conceptual framework.
- The city of Rosario as an urban space subject to application of the projects. Perspectives, possibilities, and concrete proposals.



GIVE PEACE A CHANCE PROGRAM

Organized by:

International Association of Educating Cities (IAEC), Barcelona, Spain.
Educating Cities Latin America, Municipality of Rosario, Argentina
Scouts of Argentina Civil Association

In the frame of the Global Campaign for Peace Education of The Hague Appeal for Peace



PROJECT: WHAT ARE THE MEANINGS OF VIOLENT TOYS? REPORT

Report written by:
Alicia Cabezudo
Maria Celina Del Felice
Gabriel Paccioretti
Rocío Fernandez

Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) states:

“... the education of the child shall be directed to ... the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples...”

1. ABSTRACT

The aim of this project was to observe the games and toys used by children and young people mainly in two cities in Latin America (Rosario – Argentina and Montevideo – Uruguay) so as to reflect on the violence in them. This paper will analyze games and toys trying to determine if they promote ideas, behaviors or attitudes towards structural or direct violence or on the contrary, promote peace. This approach will challenge the idea that violent toys and games are only those clearly related to war or weapons.

2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Our world is going through difficult and challenging times. Violence is still a common way to deal with conflicts and traditional approaches to prevent war and violence fail. The so called war on terrorism after September 11th, the alarming concentration of economic power, the growing inequalities, the destruction of the environment among others pose new challenges.

The International Association of Educating Cities with headquarters at Barcelona's Town Hall, and its Regional Office for Latin America based in the International Relations Bureau, Municipality of Rosario, Argentina has been extensively working to respond to these challenges in a positive, innovative and inclusive way.

Since 1999 the Municipality of Rosario through the Regional Office of Educating Cities Latin America, based at the International Relations Bureau, and SCOUTS OF ARGENTINA Civil Association have been developing the Program **Give Peace a Chance** in the frame of the **Hague Appeal for Peace Global Campaign for Peace Education**, that intends to be an invitation to cooperation and joint efforts for all those who feel committed to work for Peace both in formal and non-formal education.

The actions developed within “Give Peace a Chance Program” are framed within two main activities **Peace Education** and **Advocacy**. Peace Education seen as developing knowledge, skills and attitudes towards peaceful relationships and learning how to handle conflicts creatively and non-violently. Advocacy as actions aimed at influencing public policies, societal attitudes and socio-political processes. Within this Program, it means advocating for the use of peaceful toys and games and raising awareness about the negative influence of violent toys and games as well

as promoting critical analysis about violence being justified and rooted in our societal structures and behaviors.

It is important to note that this Program is not an isolated one, but part of a consistent strategy within the theoretical framework for the construction of the Educating City. Besides "**Give Peace a Chance**", jointly with Scouts of Argentina, we have developed a program called "**My City and the World**" promoting international understanding and dialogue and "**The City and the Rights of its People**" mainly aimed at promoting responsible citizenship and participation in the defense of Human Rights. In all cases our activities are carried out in collaboration with local authorities, governments at different levels, universities, Non-governmental organisations and also international organizations such as United Nations, UNESCO and UNICEF.


While these actions were taking place we always reflected on the reasons, purposes and impacts of our actions. These questions led us to realize the need for **Research**. Our observations and experience as educators and youth workers told us that our children were playing with toys reproducing guns, soldiers, etc. We were campaigning against war toys and for peaceful and cooperative toys and games but toy industries representatives alleged that the amount of violent toys in the market was not so significant. We asked ourselves many questions: Which are the most popular toys? Are our children playing with toys or more increasingly with computer and video games?

Our questions moved us in this search for answers to improve our work. Many more questions were waiting for us...

3. FRAMEWORK

"Give Peace a Chance Program" works through to a holistic definition of Peace. Peace is a very common word but there is little agreement as to its meaning because it means different things to different individuals, across cultures. African cultures stress peace and reconciliation; Eastern cultures stress the importance of inner peace as a basis for peaceful actions and European cultures emphasize peace and justice as inseparable aspects to build a peaceful world. All these traditions agree that peace is more than simply the absence of war/or any other form of organized physical violence such as terrorism or guerrilla warfare.

Peace was redefined by Dr. Johan Galtung (1969) as "**the absence of structural violence**", where peace is dynamic, participative and a long-term process, based on universal values and everyday practice at all levels. He called oppressive forces that are deeply rooted in social conditions "structural violence". He also extended the meaning of the term "violence" to include all things that stand in the way of the full flowering of human potential. Of course, wars are the most wanton form of structural violence, but there are many other hindrances to the flowering of human potential, including poverty, social injustices, discrimination, domestic violence, lack of freedom, of education, of health, religious freedom, etc.



As Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen explains “Threats to individual and community security come not only in the form of direct violence killing, war, attack, assault, abuse, rape but also in the form of structural violence denial of basic human needs, exploitation, marginalisation, suppression, and structural violations of human rights and cultural violence: racism, classism, casteism, sexism, ageism, and dehumanization/enemy images, all equaling = legitimization of the use of direct violence or violent structures against certain groups/peoples/members of the community”¹

Structural violence is sustained, justified and legitimized by cultural violence in various and often subtle forms. Critical analysis is needed to discover the violence implicit in our daily behavior and all culture products we consume, such as movies, music and all kind of entertainment. In this sense, looking at our children’s entertainment, games and toys, we also find expressions of this cultural violence.

Games and toys play a fundamental role in children development, providing them with opportunities to exercise behaviors, train abilities, invent plans, reproduce and transform situations or circumstances, that will help them in understanding them and elaborate solutions and alternatives. Toys bring parents or caregivers and children together in play. Early brain development is enhanced through these relationships.²

Some toys pose emotional or social risks. Graphic depictions of violence presented in interactive way, such as computer or video games can lead to acts of violence by the child. Toys (specially dolls, puppets and video games) also reproduce social roles and determine what it is expected of certain groups in society. These roles implied in toys, plus the impact of the media and the roles portrayed in TV shows and movies make certain attitudes appear as desirable and good, when sometimes they are not. Violence and death appear many times as something common, and “natural”. Research supports that exposure to violence in media and toys can have a negative impact on children's learning and development and can lead to harmful consequences.”³ This

¹ Community Security and Human Rights in Conflict Situations - Some Comments by Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen 24th of December 2002 www.transcend.org

² Shonkoff JP, Philips DA, eds. From Neurons to Neighborhoods: The Science of Early Childhood Development. Wahsington, DC: Institute of Medicine National Research Council, Board on Children, Youth, and Families, 2000, cited in Danette Glassy, and others “Selecting Appropriate Toys for Young Children: The Pediatrician’s Role”

³ http://www.nasponline.org/information/pospaper_media.html

research has shown that when entertainment media show case violence in a context in which glamorizes or trivializes it, the lessons can be destructive.⁴ They also promote negative racial, ethnic, cultural, or gender stereotypes. The toys that parents provide (or do not provide) send children a message about what it is valued. Normally, these latter ones are not considered violent toys.

In most research about this topic, violence is defined in terms of direct violence. For example, for recent studies on violence in video games, violence is defined as: “the act of destroying individuals or objects on the ingestion of individuals”⁵ and as “acts in which the aggressor causes or attempts to cause physical injury or death to another character”.

Given this perspective, this paper will analyze games and toys trying to determine if they promote ideas, behaviors or attitudes **towards structural or direct violence or on the contrary, promote peace. This approach will challenge the idea that violent toys and games are only those clearly related to direct violence, war or weapons.**

4. OBJECTIVES

4.1. General Objectives

- 4.1.1. To reflect on the social implications and meanings of toys sold in Latin American cities.
- 4.1.2. To evaluate the contents and effects on children.
- 4.1.3. To analyze the values taught through toys.

4.2. Specific Objectives

- 4.2.1. To observe the types of toys in use and sold in toyshops and shops in various neighborhoods of two Educating Cities in Latin America. Rosario (Argentina) and Montevideo (Uruguay).
- 4.2.2. To elaborate a typology for classifying toys, revising existing typologies and designing a particular one taking into consideration cultural aspects of the region.
- 4.2.3. To make interviews to children, youth, teachers and parents about the meanings of the toys they play with or know.

⁴ <http://www.lionlamb.org/jointstatement.htm>

Statement signed by: American Medical Association, American Academy of Pediatrics, American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Academy of Family Physicians, American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry

⁵ Stacy L. Smith, Ken Lachlan and Ron Tamborini, Popular Video Games: Quantifying the Presentation of Violence and Its Context, Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, March 2003

5. HYPOTHESIS

Our hypothesis is that many children play with explicitly violent toys and games and that a considerable amount of them play with non-explicitly violent games but that these may imply values and attitudes related to cultural violence following the tendencies and trends of this phenomenon in developed countries such as the US.

6. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Great numbers of toys and video games preferred by children in our cities in Latin America show violent attitudes and ideas. There is extensive research done mainly in the US about explicit physical violence in media and specifically in toys and video-games. (Dominick, 1984; Lin and Leper, 1987;; Fling et al.1992; Wiegman and Van Schie, 1998; Anderson and Dill, 2000). As Stacy Smith et al. (2003) explain: "Notwithstanding a few exceptions (Scott, 1995), there is also a growing body of experimental research that documents a causal link between playing violent video games and aggressive thoughts, interpretations, and/or behaviors"(Anderson and Ford, 1986; Anderson and Dill, 2000; Anderson and Bushman, 2001; Sherry, 2001)

Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, there is no research nor exploration done about those "ambiguously" violent toys and games, neither in the US nor in Latin America. Especially, there is no measurement of those which promote values and attitudes of a violent culture, not respecting Human Rights, therefore perpetuating a system of social inequality and injustice.

7. METHODS

We designed two questionnaires, one for children up to 12 years old and another for young people and adults. The Survey was conducted by instructed volunteers during the months of October, November and December 2002. (See Appendix 1 and 2 for questionnaires)

Samples were made in the cities of Rosario, Argentina and Montevideo, Uruguay, both cities with a population of 1 million people approximately plus some other cases in Latin America and UK which could be useful for comparative and testing purposes. The survey was a "quotas" and volunteer survey, this means it was not done randomly by selecting a certain number of cases per the number of inhabitants. For cities of one million people, a sample of about 400 cases is considered representative if done taking into consideration gender, age, etc.

These questionnaires did not include questions about socio-economic status but most cases were evenly distributed among working class, middle class and upper class neighborhoods.

Very few interviews were made to marginal and structurally poor populations. However, due to our knowledge of these cities and the amount of surveys conducted by many different volunteers, all of them youth workers or teachers, we consider this sample a reliable one.

| City | Children | Adults |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Canelones, Uruguay | 0 | 14 |
| Granadero Baigorria, Argentina | 28 | 28 |
| Isle of Wight, UK/ Otros | 3 | 6 |
| Mexico DF, Mexico | 1 | 0 |
| Montevideo, Uruguay | 121 | 296 |
| Rosario, Argentina | 251 | 147 |
| Villa Adelina, Argentina | 21 | 0 |
| Total (920) | 429 | 491 |

Classifying toys

For the purpose of this research and to conduct a relevant analysis and discussion of results we designed a criteria for classifying toys and games.

A. Explicitly Violent Toys - War Toys

Toys will be considered as war toys when in its content or format:

- Direct Violence is justified
- Direct Violence is enacted by pro-social or attractive perpetrators
- Gun-laden or acts of repeated gun violence that are graphic in nature.
- Direct Violence is rewarded or not punished, being realistic and lacking consequences
- They feature direct violence against women.
- They feature child perpetrators.

B. Implicitly Violent Toys- Ambiguous or not yet determined

Toys will be considered ambiguous when in its content or format:

- They do not show explicit physical violence
- They promote negative social, racial, or gender stereotypes.
- They promote consumerism as a synonym of happiness.
- They promote a one and only model of beauty and distorted model of reality.

C. Peaceful

Toys will be considered peaceful when in its content or format:

- They engage and encourage creativity and the use of imagination
- They foster non-violent interaction in a supportive and unconditional way
- Help promote learning and growth.
- Promote cooperation and team work with peers

8. RESULTS

QUESTIONNAIRES TO CHILDREN

Table 1: What games do you like playing at? By Age.

| Age | Total number of GAMES mentioned | Explicitly violent (A) | Implicitly violent or not determined (B) | Peaceful (C) | Observations |
|-------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|--|--------------|--|
| < 5 years | 125 | 2 | 28 | 97 | Cars are included in peaceful (8). Dolls (15) and Barbies (2). |
| 6-9 years | 403 | 13 | 85 | 323 | Not included 099 (1). Cars are included in peaceful (8). Dolls (32) and Barbies (7) are included in ambiguous. |
| 10-14 years | 835 | 4 | 153 | 694 | Not included Cars (6) are included in peaceful Dolls (20) and Barbies (10) are included in ambiguous.. |

Dolls and computers are included as not explicitly violent since many dolls are reproductions of media heroes like Ninja Turtles, Power Rangers, Rambo, etc. We notice a considerable increase in the use of computers. From observations we know that most of the video games have explicitly violent contents.

Table 2: Which toys do you like playing with? By Age.

| Age | Total number of toys | Explicitly violent (A) | Implicitly Violent or not determined (B) | Peaceful (C) | Observations |
|---|----------------------|------------------------|--|--------------|---|
| < 5 Total: 42 Yes: 38 (90 %) No: 4 (10 %) | 106 | 2 (2 %) | 25 (23 %) | 82 | Cars (19) are included in peaceful Dolls (19) and Barbies (6) are included in ambiguous |
| 6-9 Total: 43 Yes: 27 (63 %) No:16 (37 %) | 177 | 17 (10 %) | 80 (45 %) | 85 | Cars (33) are included in peaceful Dolls (43) are included in ambiguous |
| 10-14 Total: 185 Yes: 58 (31 %) No:127(69 %) | 229 | 8 (4 %) | 83 (36 %) | 140 | Cars (15) are included in peaceful Dolls (42) are included in ambiguous |

Table 3: Games and toys by Gender

| Age | Male | | | | Female | | | |
|-------|-------|--------------------|--|---------------|--------|--------------------|--|---------------|
| | Total | Explicitly violent | Implicitly Violent or not determined | Peaceful | Total | Explicitly violent | Implicitly Violent or not determined | Peaceful |
| < 5 | 66 | 2 (3 %) | Dolls: 3 Barb: 0 Other:9 (18 %) | 52 (79 %) | 58 | 0 (0 %) | Dolls:8 Barb:3 Other:2 (22 %) | 45 (78 %) |
| 6-9 | 196 | 11 (6 %) | Dolls:4 Barb:1 Other:30 (18 %) | 150 (76 %) | 214 | 1 (0.5 %) | Dolls:25 Barb:6 Other:12 (20 %) | 170 (79 %) |
| 10-14 | 308 | 4 (2 %) | Dolls:1 Barb:0 Other:69 (22%) | 234 (76 %) | 434 | 1 (<0.5%) | Dolls:13 Barb:6 Other:78 (22 %) | 336 (77 %) |

We notice that war toys are more popular among boys than among girls ranging from 2% to 6% depending on the age in comparison to 0% - 0.5% among girls.

QUESTIONNAIRES TO ADULTS

Table 4: What did you play at when you were a child?

| Total number of Games | Explicitly violent (A) | Implicitly Violent or not determined (B) | Peaceful (C) |
|-----------------------|------------------------|--|----------------|
| 1243 | 52 (4%) | Dolls: 140 Barbies: 11 Otros: 38 (15 %) | 1002 (81 %) |

Did you use to play with a toy?

Yes: 452 (92 %) No: 39 (8 %)

Table 5: What toys did you use to play with?

| Total number of Games | Explicitly violent (A) | Implicitly Violent or not determined (B) | Peaceful (C) |
|-----------------------|------------------------|---|---------------|
| 1004 | 74 (8 %) | Dolls: 226 Barbies: 25 Others: 21 (27 %) | 658 (65 %) |

Have you got contact with children up to 12 years old?

Yes: 452 (92 %)

No: 39 (8 %)

Table 6: What do boys like playing at the most?

| Total number of Toys | Explicitly violent (A) | Implicitly Violent or not determined (B) | Peaceful (C) |
|----------------------|------------------------|--|--------------|
| 909 | 86 (10 %) | Dolls: 27 Barbies: 0 Others: 142 (18 %) | 656 (72 %) |

Table 7: What do girls like playing at the most?

| Total number of Toys mentioned | Explicitly violent (A) | Implicitly Violent or not determined (B) | Peaceful (C) |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|---|---------------|
| 773 | 3 (< 0.5 %) | Dolls: 174 Barbies: 16 Others: 48 (31 %) | 532 (69 %) |

We notice a 10% of explicitly violent toys in boys in comparison to a 0.5 % in girls.

9. CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the tables and results shows that children up to 5 years old play less with those toys considered as violent and much more with peaceful toys. This is related to the fact that at this age they are not familiarized with video games, violent movies, violent toys. Nevertheless, they are in an age in which they play and copy roles (maybe in these occasions they may use toy weapons not being aware of what they are or mean). They build, invent and rehearse body games and this has to do with the exercises they do in the kindergarten and also to the fact that these toys and programs are usually forbidden to children at this age.

Those children who are 6 to 9 years old start to get familiarized with violent toys through the influence of TV programs and marketing (TV adds), but we see that they continue to use and prefer soccer, construction games (For example, "Rasti" which consists of little bricks), cars, trucks and all kinds of vehicles. Only 13 out of 403 games mentioned by children 6-9 were explicitly violent. 85 games out the total 403 were considered as ambiguous being the responses "Computers" and we cannot determine if they referred to video games and dolls, and we cannot determine if they refer to Ninja Turtles, Power Rangers, etc which are the most popular dolls especially for boys.

In the age group 10 to 14 we still see a very small number of explicitly violent games, only 4 out of 835 games were mentioned as such. But we see a considerable increase (153 out of 835) of non explicitly violent games being the most frequent mentioned: computers and video games. In most of the video games the objective is to kill, hit or destroy, making feel excitement and a sense of superiority. Out of our experience as educators and youth workers we know that at this age, going through adolescence and corporal changes, boys need to feel more powerful and strong. Soccer again was the most popular game mentioned by boys.

In general, we noted a considerable increase of children playing with computers and video games, combined with as expected soccer in boys and dolls in girls. We would like to analyse the possible meanings of two of the most mentioned toys/games which are not explicitly violent:

Video games were not explicitly violent toys/games. Many children answered that they play with their computers. We cannot infer by this answer that the content is necessarily violent, this is why these replies were classified as ambiguous although we know that 80 % of video games in entertainment shops have violent contents. After the analysis of this first survey, we realized that maybe the questions should be more explicitly and incisive so as to determine more precisely what they mean by “playing with the computer” and “playing with dolls”. As a suggestion for further development of this research, extensive interviews should be made to children, kindergarten teachers, parents and more thorough observations.

The **Barbie Doll** was also considered as a not explicitly violent toy but as a very interesting case to analyse in terms of the cultural violence implied in it. This doll which is extremely thin promotes a body model and subjectivities very closely related to eating disorders such as bulimia and anorexia. We think it is not a coincidence that the number of cases of the mentioned eating disorders in big cities in Argentina and Uruguay are comparable to those of developed countries. The Barbie Doll is most usually white, blond and blue eyed, not a common prototype of Latin American women, but girls look up to this model of beauty as the only and superior one. We also observe that many girls in their teenage years wished not only to be slim, but also white and dye their hairs in blond. We consider that this promotes racism in a very subtle but powerful way.

We can conclude that less children than expected play with explicitly violent toys as known traditionally, always very few at all ages. The highest reference was mentioned by adults responding to the question: what do boys like playing the most? 86 out of 909 of the games and toys mentioned by adults were considered explicitly violent.

From observations and experience, as well as comments from kindergarten and primary school teachers, we consider that nowadays explicit violent presents itself in many more children's toys and games than evident in these results. We presume that they were not sincere when giving the answers for the survey, as playing with a gun may have been perceived by the child as “not” good.

It is very hard to assess the consequences of cultural violence in the reproduction of structural violence and direct violence since these social dynamics work in a very elusive, subtle and at the same time powerful ways. It is our task to take up this challenge to un-cover or dis-cover the ways in which the cosmovisions of the world are built day by day, especially in the “innocent” daily life actions such as playing a game or with toys.

10. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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GIVE PEACE A CHANCE QUESTIONNAIRE NOVEMBER –DECEMBER 2002

CHILDREN UNDER 12

Enquirer data:

Last name and first name:

Phone:

E-mail:

Institution to which you belong if applies

Important information, please read carefully:

- We recommend to read all questions and clarifications carefully before starting the survey.
- When you introduce yourself to the person to be interviewed do not mention it is a survey of Give Peace a Chance Program since the answers may be biased. Simply, mention it is a survey about toys and games.
- **Please, send us your doubts/ the filled questionnaires to:**
 Ciudades Educadoras América Latina
 Dirección de Relaciones Internacionales
 Municipalidad de Rosario – Argentina
 Avda. Belgrano 328, 3er Piso, 2000 Rosario, Santa Fe, Argentina
 Tel./ Fax: 54 341 - 4802275
 E-mail: ce_americalat@rosario.gov.ar

| | |
|---|--|
| 1. Age (Please, write in numbers and letters) | |
| 2. Sex (Mark with an X what applies) | F..... M..... |
| 3. District | City: Country: |
| 4. What do you like to play the most when you were a child? (Please, state up to four possibilities) | 1. 2. 3. 4. He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer. |
| 5. Do you play with a toy/toys? Mark with an X what applies | Yes..... NO He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer. |
| 6. Which one/ones? Indicate up to four possibilities | 1. 2. 3. 4. He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer. |

APPENDIX 2

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE QUESTIONNAIRE NOVEMBER –DECEMBER 2002

YOUNG PEOPLE AND ADULTS

Enquirer data:

Last name and first name:

Phone:

E-mail:

Institution to which you belong if applies

Important information, please read carefully:

- We recommend to read all questions and clarifications carefully before starting the survey.
- When you introduce yourself to the person to be interviewed do not mention it is a survey of Give Peace a Chance Program since the answers may be biased. Simply, mention it is a survey about toys and games.
- **Please, send us your doubts/ the filled questionnaires to:**
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 Avda. Belgrano 328, 3er Piso, 2000 Rosario, Santa Fe, Argentina
 Tel./ Fax: 54 341 - 4802275
 E-mail: ce_americalat@rosario.gov.ar

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. Age (Please, write in numbers and letters) | |
| 2. Sex (Mark with an X what applies) | F..... M..... |
| 3. Studies (Mark with an X what applies) | No studies Incomplete Primary school Complete Primary School Incomplete Secondary school Complete Secondary School University/ College |
| 4. District | City: Country: |
| 5. What did you like to play the most when you were a child? (Please, state up to four possibilities) | 1. 2. 3. 4. He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer. |
| 6. Did you use to play with a toy/toys? Mark with an X what applies | Yes..... NO He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer. |

| | |
|---|---|
| <p>7. Which one/ones?</p> | <p>1. 2. 3. 4. He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer.</p> |
| <p>8. Are you in contact with children younger than 12 years old? (No matter if they are your children, nephews, etc. etc.) Mark with an X what applies</p> | <p>Yes..... NO He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer. If the answer is Yes, go to question 9 If the answer is No, go to question 12</p> |
| <p>9. What do boys like playing at the most?</p> | <p>1. 2. 3. 4. He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer.</p> |
| <p>10. What do girls like playing at the most?</p> | <p>1. 2. 3. 4. He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer.</p> |
| <p>12. Do you remember which are the last toys you gave as presents or bought?</p> | <p>1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Never bought or gave as presents. (Go to question 15) He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer.</p> |
| <p>13. Which of these toys you consider violent ? (Mark with an X following the order of toys mentioned in question 12)</p> | <p>None 1. 2. 3. 4. He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer.</p> |
| <p>14.1. Why do you consider these toys violent?</p> | <p>..... </p> |

| | |
|--|---|
| <p>14.2 Why do you consider them non- violent?</p> | <p>He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer.</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer.</p> |
| <p>15. Which toys do you consider violent? (Indicate up to four possibilities)</p> | <p>1.</p> <p>2.</p> <p>3.</p> <p>4.</p> <p>5. None</p> <p>He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer.</p> |
| <p>16. Do you think that the violent toys manufacturing should be ... (Mark with an X what applies)</p> | <p>a. Banned.</p> <p>b.Regulated</p> <p>c.Non regulated as it is now</p> <p>d. He/ She doesn't know or doesn't answer</p> |

NORDIC EDUCATION RESEARCH ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE ON

EDUCATION WIDENS DEMOCRACY – OR?

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Knowledge, Democracy and Justice in a Globalizing World

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Introduction

I think of both education and democracy as two ends of a rope that has jagged ends of loose fibres hanging at its ends. Somewhere in the middle of the several loose ends, there are some core fibres from the education end of the rope that fit perfectly with some strands from the democracy rope. But the connections are not always obvious.

In similar vein, in some instances education does widen democracy by providing a sustainable site in which the open minds of the young (i.e. the future citizens) can be exposed to notions about society. On the other hand, democracy widens education in the sense that conceptions of societal organization that arise from outside education can enter and broaden its curricular repertoire.

The converse of this is of course that once a set of notions in a repertoire stagnates for extensive periods without sensing what is occurring in society, both education and democracy can stymie each other, while together they both stymie society.

Education can regurgitate and recycle old notions about society and relationships that are no longer relevant for years before reforms bring about purposive changes in core norms, while democracy can ride unhindered “over people’s dead bodies” like it did for centuries when citizenship itself was denied to slaves, black people and women; or when the Nazis did what they did to the Jews in the 1940s .

This paper thus seeks to draw attention to the inter-relationship between complexity and simplicity surrounding many of the concepts that we so easily presume as unproblematic. Oftentimes we rightly and understandably have to reduce complexities in order to find something workable about ideas that hold valuable propensities, and in which we need to invest our futures.

Indeed, as Vaknin has so well put in his article “*The Complexity of Simplicity*”, it is simple procedures (codes, programs), that often yield the most complex results. In other words, complexity resides precisely in the simple program that created it. Complexities draw attention to ambiguities in the existing application of the concepts and indeterminacy of those applications, and enables us to acknowledge the existence of competing, distinct,

but equally valid meanings inherent in the constellation of concepts that surround the democratic projects of our societies.

This paper is not written to invite a polemic response. The polemist proceeds encased in the privilege to wage war and make such a struggle a just undertaking. The person the polemist confronts is not a partner in search for the truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful and whose existence constitutes a threat (Rabinow 1984).

Rather, my purpose is to invite you all to participate as fellow interlocutors, taking in Freire's (1972) wise counsel about dialogue, when he stated that dialogue is the encounter between people mediated by the world in order to name the world. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and the dialogue itself. Dialogue cannot exist without humility, and cannot be an act of arrogance. It requires an intense faith in humankind. In fact Freire states that faith in humankind is an a priori requirement (Freire 1972, pp: 61-62).

This paper therefore seeks to build relationships of critical empathy and exchange in the Freirean project of "naming the world".

Education and Schooling

The focus of this gathering is the question of education and democracy. Education has often been called the mirror of society. It reflects the default setting of society at any given point. In its loosest sense, education means the entire learning experience whether provided deliberately or more informally.

In its narrowest sense, formal education means deliberate intervention meant to affect the learning experience of children or other presumed or actual novices through formal, predictable, stereotypic learning experiences using an arsenal that includes apprenticeship, initiation, lectures, sermons and scolding as well as schooling (Henry 1976).

Despite the existence of so many "grammars of schooling" (Rockwell 1999) across the world, education ends up constantly being reduced to schooling, which is formal education usually carried out in a place separated from ordinary life and conducted by an expert "stranger". This insertion of the stranger as expert distinguishes it from, for example – initiation (Andersson-Levitt 2004) -- in which the expert IS NOT a stranger, but a person whose authority and knowledge is sanctioned, and can be de-sanctioned by the community of the participating learners.

In fact, for many in societies very far away from this conference site, the school is not just the place surrounded by a fence (whether real or symbolic) at whose gate parents turn over their children everyday. It is the place at which the big and small processes of de-linking of children's from their lives at home and in the neighbourhood begins. Those benign-looking square structures amidst round huts represent not only sites in which "true knowledge" is to be imparted, but also the place in which only particular ways of knowing are considered legitimate.

For many in Africa and elsewhere in the world Europe colonized, the school was the site at which you were to begin and cultivate the systematic denigration of one's identity, the

site at which you learnt how to laugh at your own gods while being instructed to worship other people's gods. School education is now a human right, it is compulsory, and is considered to be the place in which to foster democracy, and "widen" it.

So, if in the search for simplicity we take it as our cut-off point the bottom-line that education is cultural capital transmitted via instructions in schools, and institutionalized by the certificates issued by the educational system (Adick 2002), then of course there is no problem at all. All we will have danced and wiggled about during these three days would be how amazing it is that the cultural cognitive capital is so convertible, and how wonderful it is that there is almost a one-on-one correspondence between the capitalist world economy and the educational developments "world-wide".

To this we can add, how convenient it is that it all makes "our" life as propagators of this singular model so much simpler!! In fact, one may even argue that education brings about decolonization and resolves the turbulent histories of abuse and deprivation of colonialism and imperialism by promoting the "neutral" cultural capital transmitted via the worldwide web of schools.

If we did this, then we can proceed to take the next natural steps. For instance, we can ignore the rather active, if not aggressive presence of forces of standardization and convergence such as the multitude of international development organizations in the expanding field of global educational decision making after World War working under various flags to impose educational expansion worldwide (Chabbot 1998).

Fortunately for me, as I am sure is the case with countless others not able to attend this event, the organizers of this conference had the faint twinkle of other possibilities or configurations, which they permitted official space through the very important two letter word **OR**, followed by a question mark (?).

I can also confess that I accepted to come and make this presentation because it is my conviction that it is precisely in this little space of possibility that we can cultivate conversations and dialogues about other views on the many "taken-for-granted" as we struggle to participate in the Freirean project of "naming the world".

I will therefore argue that the optimism that enables the link between education and democracy to be made is anchored in the existence of the paradoxical situation of "dependency" within "interdependence" – by which is meant that education is dependent on global and historical antecedents, at the same time as it acts along a rather independent 'pedagogic logic of its own.

Education answers to the environment, but has been able to produce some of the most delightful unguided and independent missiles that have radically altered the course of society.

Moreover, radical witnesses of centuries of alienation and what Adick called the legacy of one-sided solutions to life and sterile stereotypes have begun to see the link between this mono-cultural model and the global brain-drain from the so-called Third World countries to the developed (Adick 2002).

They have also pointed to the very real prospect of education serving as a fourth pillar of Western, in particular American foreign policy (in which foreign policy says "no" to

revolutions or any change that is not favourable to U.S while aggressively marketing the culture of the west as cool, as the most just, the most tolerant, the most willing to constantly reassess and improve itself, and the best model for the future) (see Rothkopf 1997).

If we take Edward Said's statement that imperialism is the "implanting of settlements on distant territory", then we can extrapolate that cultural imperialism is the implanting of cultural and cognitive "settlements" on distant territories (Said 1993:9).

According to Schiller, cultural imperialism is the act of exerting pressure, force, and sometimes bribery in order to get a society to shape its social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating centre. In cultural imperialism, there is a fixed reality that exists alongside an individual's or an organization's own created meaning of reality (Schiller, 1976).

How, then, would educationists, democrats, and ethicists reconcile the routinization of the above undemocratic, non-dialogical model of global development with the provisions in the International Convention on Social, Cultural and Economic Rights in which it is a fundamental right of humanity to be allowed to preserve the mental, physical, intellectual, and creative aspects of one's society?

Democracy's own ghosts

In order to trace the link between education and democracy and to identify the tenuous aspects of this linkage, it is important to recall the two levels of creative tensions around which democracy is constructed.

At the first level sits the tension between democracy as a *universal aspiration for popular self rule* and as a *historically bounded form of governance* in modern states (i.e. liberal democracy). The second level sits the tension between *democratic institutions* and the diverse forms and discourses of *democratic politics* in particular national and regional contexts.

The reflexive thing about it is that democratic institutions will only flourish if they are supported by broad-based democratic politics. The design and structure of democratic institutions also opens spaces for democratic politics, and shapes how elected governments deal with the substantive issues of participation, socio-economic justice, and conflict (Luckham et al 1998).

But as has been shown in many instances, the existence of democratic institutions does not necessarily mean the spread of democratic politics.

Many questions also continue to challenge the idea of democracy. For instance, as the *meaning of democracy* in different regions of the world is not interpreted in exactly the same way as the Western liberal democracies, the outcome of democracy may not be the same everywhere.

The *extent and 'depth' of democracy* is also under scrutiny as questions arise over how far the actual practice of democracy is consistent with the aspirations of democracy especially in the way disadvantaged groups – including women, the rural poor – experience citizenship in democratic politics.

The *'policy-effectiveness' of democracy* is also raised: can democracy meet the demands of ordinary people, particularly the poor as well as reconciling the conflicting expectations regarding social equity and economic growth?

The *'conflict-management' effectiveness of democracy* comes up: i.e. how far can democracies promote compromise in the face of conflicts, especially those that have the potential to be violent, including those based on seemingly primordial and non-negotiable identity claims? (Luckham et al *ibid*: 4-5).

In each of these instances, education's role and content has to be defined. One then could ask, what or how does education contribute to the meaning, extent and depth, policy effectiveness, and conflict management effectiveness of democracy?

Furthermore, both the Athenian model of democracy practiced in early Greece which put great emphasis on **maximizing active citizenship**; and the liberal representative model very strong in the US and England which emerged at the end of the C18th with its emphasis on **political contestation, on rational discussion and on avoiding tyranny** can be queried from the perspective of substantive exclusion in that 'citizenship' excluded women and slaves; while in England, suffrage was based on property.

Thus it can be said that in the West liberal states only became substantive democracies after the political mobilization of the broad mass of citizens, including urban working class and women behind demands which included the extension of the franchise to all adult citizens. It is this democratic revolution which increased citizen involvement in the affairs of government, that expanded the concept of citizenship itself to cover economic, social, as well as political entitlements (Luckham et al. *ibid* 6-9).

If institutions are a socially constructed set of arrangements routinely exercised and accepted, the distinction between *democratic institutions* and *democratic politics* is akin to that between *formal/procedural* democracy (which emphasize institutions) and *substantive* democracy (which emphasize citizenship participation and redistribution of power). (Kaldor & Vejvoda 1997).

Democratic politics (Beetham 1994) would thus require that political contestation is tempered by certain basic moral and political principles including popular control (over governments and political elites), and political equality (among all citizens). Democratic politics are those inclusive forms of politics which aim to hold democratic institutions to their democratic promise by:

- a. ensuring that *open and effective* challenges can be made to governments and their policies through free and fair elections, the party system and other forms of political contestation;
- b. increasing the *scope of citizen participation* so that the exercise of power is based so far as possible upon permanent dialogue between government and citizens;
- c. maximizing the *accountability and transparency* of the holders of political power and bureaucratic office at all levels of government;
- d. guaranteeing *equal political and civil rights* for all citizens as well as the basic social and economic entitlements that can enable them to fully exercise these rights;

- e. providing *accessible procedures* through which these rights and entitlements can be protected, not just through the courts, but also in day to day relationships with the agents of the state;
- f. guaranteeing *effective citizenship redress* against infringements of rights by private (e.g. corporate) interests as well as by the state; and
- g. providing mechanisms to assure that such private or corporate interests can be held *accountable* by governments and citizens especially where they impinge upon the public domain and citizens' rights.

Democratic politics therefore depends on the development of a culture of informed participation, which, in turn depends of the capacity of citizens to hold powerful private and state agents to account. Democratic politics emphasizes the deep politics of society and from there, posits the question as to what that implies for the high politics of the state.

Democratic politics would pay great attention to democratic deficits which can occur when democracy is:

- o is narrowed down to elections as the arbiter of political succession,
- o when formal equality does not say much about the social, cultural or economic structure within which this equality is embedded,
- o when running for office at any level of government becomes a very expensive affair, which ends up leaving the masses with a narrow pool of people (elite of means) to choose from – legitimating perfectly the social and economic status quo, and
- o when popular sector challenge is repressed, and redistributive policies are blocked (Bello 2005).

The resolution of these situations however, may require the building of new consensus at the legal, policy as well as civil society levels. Education may be the cart rather than the horse, and vice versa depending on the form and direction of the revolutionary trajectory.

Globalization, interdependence, and the challenge of living together

Up to this point the only certainty we seem to have had is that the international community has entered a period of tremendous global transition that has brought prosperity to some, interwoven myriad others through the medium of technology and the internet, but created more social problems than solutions for much of the world's population.

The end of super-power rivalry and the growing North/South disparity in wealth and access to resources, coincide with an alarming increase in violence, poverty and unemployment, homelessness, displaced persons and the erosion of environmental stability (Ayton-Shenker 1995).

At the same time, previously isolated peoples are being brought together voluntarily and involuntarily into new and ever closer neighbourhoods by the increasing integration of markets, the emergence of new regional political alliances, remarkable advances in telecommunications, and transportation that have prompted unprecedented demographic shifts. The resulting confluence of peoples and cultures is an increasingly global,

multicultural world brimming with tension, confusion and conflict in the process of its adjustment to pluralism.

The wide gap between the pace of economic globalization sitting atop a pile of unresolved historical grievances on the one hand, and the reality of a tense, mistrustful, and anxiety-haunted world society on the other, thrusts into our conscience a new, pungent, and ambivalence-filled human situation we can no longer escape.

As nations and communities big and small rummage about in this confusion, one detects various degrees of hankering for a lost age of social harmony, cultural homogeneity and commonly-shared values – occasionally confusing the past state of things for a vision for the future. In the meantime, the perceived fragmentation of society, concerns about crime, persistent undercurrents of racism, and growing distrust of neighbour and government, have strengthened the attraction of many to the numerous affinity groups mushrooming everywhere (Odora Hoppers 2005, Ayton-Shenker 1995) .

And so, from several decades of celebrating the very diffuseness and seemingly ambivalent culture-blind cosmopolitanism that modernity swept everyone into, and into which education has been dozing happily for quite a while now, the present era of globalization is generating a peculiar reversal as those very concerns create percolations of cultural, ethnic, and religious affinity groups offering a close-knit cohesion of common interest and shared loyalties.

In situations in which large immigrant communities find themselves surrounded by a mainstream culture, this percolation tends to encourage antipathy toward those outside these “shared loyalty” while fermenting a hankering for the familiar though geographically distant safe-haven of a “back-home” of a fictitious undisturbed social harmony. Out of this emerge a form, content as well as rationale for the sustenance of a parallel, quasi-resistance, proto-protest sub-culture right in the heartland of a mainstream culture (Odora Hoppers 2005).

This climate of change and acute vulnerability therefore raises new challenges to our ongoing pursuit of universal human rights as we acknowledge that cultural background, inter-cultural knowledge and inter-cultural education are the new essentials of existence in the globalizing world that is at once enriching, but also disorienting.

Given the perception that homogeneity has been posed globally in the form of the western way, it is important to recognize that the move towards diversity and richness of popular and local discourses, codes and practices that resist playback systemicity (Featherstone 1994) is often anchored in the sedimented resentment and associated sense of injustice that this memory of distorted universalization keeps on awakening in billions of the world population strewn across the globe.

Amidst all this, culture, having eluded the nation state, it finds itself trapped within the glass ceiling of the globe as a single space populated with new unresolved questions, but which should constitute the generative theatre and space of unity within which the new notions of diversity can take place.

In this new limited arena also lies possible meeting point between a new moment of truth in which the historical proto-universalism of Western identity meets the **discourse of**

human identity within which the call for justice includes **cultural justice** (doing justice to particularities and differences).

But globalization adds two other complicating factors. *Firstly* is the fact that when the breaking down of barriers has favored the strongest performers and their values, the link between globalization and justice is not that obvious. *Secondly*, globalization of any religion produces a situation in which there are no longer 'outsiders' who can serve as a repository of evil. This means that within globalization the person who was outside now becomes a neighbor with the result that the outside/inside distinction fails.

Featherstone looks at this moment as surmises that it can lead to any one or all of the following:

- a. Ecumenism, tolerance and universalism **in which everyone is included**, OR
- b. Resistance to globalization in terms of counter movements such as the various non-western fundamentalisms **which react against 'Westoxication'**, OR
- c. In the West, groups of people seek to embark on a neo-conservative program of **re-differentiation to restore western Christendom**. (Featherstone 1994)

As we are made aware of the alternative traditions and histories and the layers of local cultures which were suppressed as a result of the prior historical project of universalism, it becomes impossible to talk about a common culture without talking about who is defining it, within which set of interdependencies and power-balances, for what purposes and with reference to which outside culture(s) have to be discarded, rejected or demonized in order to generate a sense of that longed for cultural identity (Beyer, 1994).

In other words, it is this awareness that can lead to a re-shaping of broader goals of education as well as parameters of democracy.

Diversity, Tolerance, and Justice

If in a social context, the term **diversity** refers to the presence in one population of a wide variety of cultures, opinions, ethnic groups, socio-economic backgrounds, then diversity should be manifested in the existence of many peoples contributing their unique experiences to humanity's culture.

For its part, **tolerance** (somewhat akin to the idea of negative peace) is the collective and individual practice of not persecuting those who may believe, behave or act in ways that one may not personally approve of. In the wider sociological sense, "tolerance" carries with it the understanding that "intolerance" breeds violence and social instability, and has therefore become the social term of choice to define the practical rationale of permitting uncommon social practice and diversity.

But oftentimes, one only tolerates people who are disliked for their differences. While people deemed undesirable may be disapproved of, "tolerance" would require that the party or group in question be **left undisturbed, physically or otherwise**, and that criticism directed toward them be free of inflammatory or inciteful efforts. To tolerate something is to put up with it even though we might be tempted to suppress it.

The next step, then, is to name which things it is that we are tempted to suppress? Here, too, we know the answer: we are tempted to suppress those things that we deem

mistaken, painful, wrong, harmful, offensive, or in some other way unworthy of approval. Tolerance therefore cannot be neutral about what is good, for its very purpose is to guard goods and avert evils. The circumstantial element in the practice of tolerance is right judgment in the protection of greater ends against lesser ends.

Despite these shortcomings, the importance of tolerance for social cohesion and democratic political participation has been strongly emphasized by many analysts. To Amanda Gouws (2003) tolerance is defined as the refusal to resort to violence, force or coercion in relation to objectionable political alternatives. But this simple requirement for democracy is difficult to sustain when opponents are perceived not only as different, but also when political alternatives are held by groups who are perceived of as threatening.

To clarify this point, let us retrieve some debates on the tension between the local and global. Some analysts have stated that the stability of national identity is based on a sense of collective uniformity in the present and continuity with the past. But it is also said that the nation is a collective that misunderstands its own history and hates its neighbors.

When we move to the global level, we find similar contradictory signals of both celebration and opposition. On the one hand global capital in its speculative circulatory mode appears as corrosive of local cultural values breeding resistance. On the other hand, in its entrepreneurial efforts to maximize consumer satisfaction, economic globalization requires new forms of cross cultural communication and mutual recognition that valorize diverse local cultural values (Hofmeyr 2003).

But in the intersection between the global and the local, it is important to emphasize that resources are at stake; not merely material resources but also the **human resources of imagination, creativity and identity**. Globalization has accelerated the pace and scope of transnational movements of money, technology and people, but it has, by its very fluidity, also generated new images of possibility and new ideals of human solidarity.

By moving beyond the notion of human solidarity which is based on the assumption that all people share a common underlying humanity, we could look further and picture the symbolic **cultural and social resources for negotiating human identity**.

As we take this further, a more profound form of tolerance emerges which resides in the capacity to develop respect, understanding and mutual recognition of others. Here, the ordeals of imagination undergone by those who have survived colonialism, genocide or slavery can also find space and inform our understanding of human solidarity under impossible conditions.

It is also here that Kwenda's notion of cultural justice takes us from tolerance to respect in cultural politics. If culture is **that which is taken for granted** - a comfort zone of everyday, ordinary ways of living, then it is easy to recognize why a threat to a people's culture is perceived as a personal threat (Kwenda 2003).

What Kwenda proposes is **functional respectful co-existence**. By *respectful* he means mutuality in paying attention, according regard and recognition, as well as taking seriously what the Other regards as important. By *functional* is meant that coexistence is predicated on a degree of interaction that invokes the cultural worlds of the players, in essence – what they, in their distinctive ways, take for granted.

He takes for his analogy; the situation of Africa which is very instructive for the deepening of our discussions here. In Africa he argues, social cohesion does not depend on state sovereignty, liberal democracy, the advance of modernity or the global economy, but upon the millions of African people willing to sacrifice what they 'take for granted', by bearing the uncomfortable burden of speaking and acting in unfamiliar cultural idioms within all areas of everyday life. Africans are **not passive victims** of cultural imperialism although they have been subject to coercive interventions, but **active agents** in negotiating unfamiliar, strange and alien cultural terrain.

According to Kwenda, **cultural injustice** occurs when people are forced by coercion or persuasion to submit to the burdensome condition of suspending – or permanently surrendering – what they naturally take for granted. This means that in reality, the subjugated person has no linguistic or cultural '**default drive**' – that critical minimum of ways, customs, manners, gestures and postures that facilitate uninhibited, un-self-conscious action (p:70).

By **cultural justice** is meant that the burden of constant self-consciousness is shared or at the very least recognized, and where possible, rewarded. The sharing part is very important because it is only in the **mutual vulnerability** that this entails that the meaning of **intimacy** and **reciprocity** in community can be discovered.

It is also in this **sharing that** on the one hand, **cultural difference is transcended**, and on the other, **cultural arrogance**, (by which is meant that disposition to see in other cultures both difference and deficiency) **is overcome**. The cultural work that is entailed in constructing functional tolerance therefore goes beyond providing equal opportunities in say, education, to the **unclogging of hearts filled with resentment**.

Social cohesion especially in the southern part of Africa would easily collapse if Africans as the natural majority, were not willing to suspend 'that which is taken for granted' and bear the burden of unfamiliar cultural transformations. Cultural justice therefore requires at minimum, that this burden of the unfamiliar needs to be **shared more equitably by people from different cultural backgrounds** across society (Kwenda 2003).

Thus if we take European understandings of culture (as is the case with reading literature), as being morally edifying and spiritually enriching, for culture to function in this manner, it has to be experienced in a positive way. It would follow then, that if culture is experienced negatively, then it would have the opposite effect (i.e. morally degrading and spiritually impoverishing). To speak of cultural justice in this scenario, is to expect that cultures are experienced positively so that their healing and enriching capacities may be released.

This is a protest against conditions and circumstances that make negative experiences of cultures seem **inevitable, or even desirable** (Kwenda 2003: 67-68). In the context of Africa, the legacy of colonialism and apartheid has made culture become a serious bone of contention with some cultures being regarded as superior to others. The ambivalence of education towards this unacceptable situation has made the field resemble the emperor with no clothes on!

Changing vantage points, and looking at the issue of justice from the perspective of post-colonial psychological situation, it becomes possible to understand the phenomenon in

which militancy is built on ambivalent feelings that combine both the reparation and justice impulses, alongside with aggressivity and the desire for revenge (Verghes 2001).

The main problem has been that it is this ambivalence has constantly eluded analysis, and has thus been hard to confront and resolve using either the post colonial discourses and strategies, or through the meta-narrative of reason and even education.

Most countries coming out of the colonial experience have thus been unable to figure out the correct strategies to address the issue of reparation, which is about justice that is reasonable and measurable, and revenge that is often absurd and incomplete.

I would argue, concurring with Verghes, therefore that it is neither democracy nor education in its present form that contains the clue to confronting this problem. Rather, it is the very African indigenous knowledges and the complex psychological therapeutic strategies within them that do provide an alternative approach and shows us that there may be losses that are irretrievable, and that there may be no total reparation of a wrong. It prepares us to live with the loss of a loss and alerts us to the fact that there may be no return to a pre-loss state.

Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) and their practitioners have devised forms of therapy that combine love and hatred, and which emphasizes the issue of personal debt owed by victims as well in terms of determining new futures. It is this kind of psychology that should have been brought into play immediately after independence in many colonized societies (Odora Hoppers 2001, Verghes 2001).

Public policies, legislation and educational programmes designed to foster tolerance for instance, must therefore be constantly queried for what they reify as the default setting, whether they reinforce stereotypes, intensify, or lower anxieties. New forms of civic education must enable learners to work towards practising cultural justice, fostering intimacy and reciprocity, and especially working towards what Kwenda called “the unlogging of hearts filled with resentment”.

Human Rights and The Human Rights Approach

In the attempt to find tools to help us manage diversity, the **human rights approach** has emerged as an instrument of choice in international discourse of the late 1990s. This is a legislative and social justice-focused strategy which emphasizes the balance of rights, not content of rights, in the promotion of tolerance. This approach is backed by the United Nations as proclaimed in its Charter, which states that human rights are "for all without distinction".

As a tool in the implementation of development policy, the point is to alter the status quo and impasse around development – which is seen to have largely failed. The first assumption is that if human rights are emphasized, then the moral quality around the development trajectory shall be improved and humankind will benefit. Another assumption is that human rights is an accepted moral framework globally and is thus legally and morally binding.

In its substance, the human rights “approach” to development links the understanding and promotion of human rights to the resolution of the problem of poverty. Ideally, it is

stated in literature that this approach pays attention to the **root causes of poverty**, “injects” economic and social rights into the discussions on poverty, and empowers people to demand development and justice as a right and not as charity. It also focuses on the relation between the state and its citizens with the principal duty holder of all human rights being the state (UNDP 2000).

Democracy and human rights are not “rewards for development” but are critical in achieving it. This implies that there is a collective commitment based on the vision of humanity, and the solidarity required in order to fulfil the vision of a better life for all. The value addition element in the HRA is the introduction of the moral dimension, urgency, responsibility and *accountability* to the implementation of development objectives (SIDA 2000).

But like democracy, tolerance and globalization, the human rights discourse need some critical attention as well. Falk has drawn attention to some historical fact that when the 1948 Human Rights declaration was drawn within the UN framework, the **United States** was the triumphant power that had just rescued Europe from itself. The US’s emphasis at that point in time, was on the failure of the liberal democracies to heed the Nazi internal repressiveness in the years of the build-up to WWII. It seemed important then, to posit an international humanitarian responsibility in relation to the possible re-emergence of totalitarian abuses of the future.

For the old the **old East**, the UDHR was not contentious because the communists saw in it a clear ideological high ground with respect to issues of societal well being on which they had scored remarkably well. Moreover, they had the political power to contest the economic model of capitalism on which the development of the west was premised, and had the military power to back their position and safeguard their inherent values, ideology and political systems. They therefore regarded diplomacy related to human rights as an opportunity to challenge the western emphasis on individual civil and political rights by championing and invoking the socialist emphasis on the economic and social rights of a collective nature.

To **political and intellectual elites** on both sides of the divide as well as in the South, human rights was regarded as providing an arena for the exchange of propaganda charges on the plane of international relations (Falk 1999:94). The small and large scripts associated with the crafting of the UDHR were therefore not about a better world for all, but a mixture of triumphantism, minimalism, and containment.

The **liberal democracies** with strong class structures in particular were intent on ensuring that redundancy in this area was achieved, because of their worries about potential activism from the poorer sections of their respective citizenries. **Authoritarian states** in the old East for their part, could subscribe to such normative standards which were so incompatible with their operating codes because of the sense that there was no prospect for either *implementation from without*, or *pressure from within*.

But it was the *anti-colonial struggle* which involved countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America that drew attention to active forms of oppressive rules at the transnational level; and the *anti-apartheid campaign* that created robust transnational political support for the human rights of self determination, which, though initially absent from the Universal Declaration, became a foundational basis for human rights in general. The right to self

determination was later elevated to the eminence of being posited as a bridge between economic, social and cultural rights; and political and civil rights (Falk 1999 pp:96).

Apart from these movements, there was a *significant partially subversive presence* within the sinews of government that adhered itself to idealist views and believed in some sort of global community based on *law and morality* that was both *possible and necessary*. This force was guided mainly by notions of civilizational solidarity rather than conquest. (Falk *ibid*: 96, 97).

But the limitations of the Human Rights discourse have been most patently captured in Howard Richard's analyses. To begin with, he acknowledges that "rights" is an especially valuable concept because it is a concept that almost everybody respects as having moral authority.

It makes an inward appeal to conscience especially in the respect that most people develop inwardly to guide their own conduct and avoid infringing on other people's rights. It has moral authority in the sense that one is considered justified while acting within one's rights, and also in the sense that one is considered to be justified in becoming indignant when one's rights are violated (Richards 2004).

But according to Richards, what we need is something more than respect for the rights of others.

Citing Hegel, (Smith 1989) Richards argues that there are too many rights. And **where there is a surplus of rights**, Hegel said, **force decides**. Commonly in a war, or in a barroom brawl, both sides can paint with the language of rights to give their cause the colour of moral superiority, and to give themselves the colour of 'rights errant' fighting for a righteous cause.

Where culturally recognized precepts of right gives both sides good moral arguments, there is a moral stalemate, where both sides are rhetorically armed with good reasons for declaring the other evil. It is at this point that force becomes the final arbiter.

The second argument drawn from Karl Marx, is that **the stubborn persistence of poverty, the instability of capitalist systems, and the exploitation of labour are all consistent with recognizing the rights of humanity embodied in the laws of commerce**. Where everything is sold at its market price, in a free market, with property rights respected, it is often the case that labour is sold for little or nothing. This is a norm which is also endorsed by the very same societies that harp on human rights.

The third argument draws from Solzhenitsyn and Mahatma Gandhi (Berman 1980, Dalton 1982) is that in principle, rights without duties are unworkable. Emphasizing rights at the expense of duties is similar to adopting Denis Diderot's 18th century definition of liberty: 'whatever the law does not forbid is allowed'.

Like liberty, conceived as being allowed to do anything at all with a few exceptions, rights-talk can easily lend itself to an irresponsible ethic. It authorizes everyone to say what they are supposed to be allowed to do, and are supposed to have and supposed to get. **But it does not make anyone responsible for contributing to the welfare of others, or to the common good** (Richards 2004)

Citizenship, Ecology, Knowledge and Democratic Politics

To begin with, citizenship is yet another of those concepts that is discussed all too easily with arm-chair comfort of academics and politicians. But when one sees citizenship for instance, from the perspective of colonized settler societies in which the foreign elite usurped the notion of citizenship and created **categories of superior and inferior citizens** as a marker between themselves and the indigenous citizens, the image that emerges is not at all a comfortable one.

This notion of citizenship is located on the presumed superiority of empire, and accepted time of modernity, in which one has to reach modernity to be a full citizen. Within this, development as a project **creates the inclined plane of progress** such that indigenous communities, peasants and other forms of marginalized time can climb up to the space of citizenship.

What still needs to come out is the fact that ethnicity is not merely about identity but about the **right to different forms of lived time** which both multiculturalism and diversity need, not just as texts in a syllabus but as part of an active constitution in a contemporary world (Visvanathan 2001).

Within this, Ecology is a subversive movement because, in Visvanathan's words, 'it runs at right angles to science.' It is a search for new epistemologies for science, **new frameworks for diversity beyond the museumization** that made western science smell of 'death and formaldehyde.' Ecology is thus an attempt not just to promote grassroots democracy with its ideas of participation and consensus but to confront one of the great issues of modern democracy: **the opposition between expert and layman**. It seeks to show that scientific controversies need forms of resolution beyond standard scientific models.

In the search for knowledge as an intrinsic part of democratic practice, **cognitive justice** stands out as a rubric within which methodologies for a **dialogue of knowledges** and knowledge systems can be contemplated. By cognitive justice is meant the **right of many forms of knowledge to exist because all knowledges** are seen as partial and complementary and because they contain incommensurable in-sights.

We therefore need to cultivate and practice sensitivity to the **fate of different knowledges and their link to livelihood, lifestyles and forms of life in diverse parts** of the world (Visvanathan 2001).

The **integration of knowledge systems**, development of **protocols for reciprocal valorization among traditions of knowledge**, and the development of **bicultural expertise** demands a **theory of freedom** which is something more infinite, multi-vocal, and inexhaustible.

New perspectives on knowledge, democracy and justice need to incorporate the **victim's narrative and the phenomenology of humiliation**, which can bring to relief the relationship between **colonialism, epistemological disenfranchisement, intercultural conflict**, and the concomitant demands for globalization to include an agenda for **conflict resolution at a cultural level**.

Globalization should, from this point of view, lead to the promotion of **shared understandings, values, and cooperative actions on a trans-national and trans-societal level** (Pickett & Fatnowna 2001, Odora Hoppers 2001, Visvanathan 2001).

The indigenous pathway to a post-post-modern integrative paradigm shift requires that **decolonization occurs from both angles**, and for a mutually enriching sharing and difference that is essential in effecting encompassing transformation in world views and ethics of humankind, a **forward looking liberation of substance and a shared paradigm shift**.

As **objects of earlier analysis have become speaking subjects**, what begins as marginalized perspectives speaking back to the layers of constructions and proscribed definitions should evolve into **“agency” that should be exercised by both perpetrators and victims** as both are subjects personally and collectively within the determining effects of circumstance.

The task is then, not for a return to some golden age, but for a **transformation to new futures of a very different kind**, a self reflexive praxis, a way forward that is achievable through becoming involved critical explorers of human and societal possibilities (Pickett & Fatnowna 2001).

Here, the concept of **ethical space** (Roger Poole 1972, Ermine 2000) focuses attention on the tension riddled enterprise of **cultural border crossing**. It is a space where a precarious and fragile window of opportunity exists for critical conversations about race, gender, class, freedom and community.

It is a space with a moment of possibility to create substantial, **sustained ethical and moral understanding between cultures**. It is a statement of recognition of cultural jurisdictions at play in which dialogue about intentions, values and assumptions can be brought out and negotiated.

Its imperatives include a two-way bridge of awareness building and understanding; no preconceived notions of the other's existence; values, motivation and assumptions of both sides are brought out into the open; and dialogue on issues of knowledge, ownership, control, and benefit are facilitated.

Conclusions: Educations' Challenge to a Diverse World

So, does education widen democracy? It does through the multiplier of children, the ethos implanted through the school. Does democracy widen education? Yes, through infusing education processes with new insights being developed and consolidated at societal level in an on-going manner.

But neither democracy nor education is without serious baggage, lapses and deficits. For this reason, they should be regarded as complex concepts encompassing complex processes, in a complex globalizing world in need of serious healing.

For myself, I am convinced that Foucault was probably right when he stated:

...., if a philosophy of the future exists, it will have to be born outside Europe, or as a consequence of the encounters and frictions between Europe and non-Europe. (Michel Foucault in interview, 1978).

What I call for is that this philosophy and pathway to a post-post-modern integrative paradigm shift requires that **decolonization occurs from both angles**, and for a mutually enriching sharing that effects **encompassing transformation in world views and ethics of humankind**. We need this **forward looking liberation of substance** and a **shared paradigm shift** now, more than ever!

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The Human Rights Effects of World Bank Structural Adjustment, 1981–2000

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Does the implementation of a World Bank structural adjustment agreement (SAA) increase or decrease government respect for human rights? Neoliberal theory suggests that SAAs improve economic performance, generating better human rights practices. Critics contend that the implementation of structural adjustment conditions causes hardships and higher levels of domestic conflict, increasing the likelihood that regimes will use repression. Bivariate probit models are used to account for World Bank loan selection criteria when estimating the human rights consequences of structural adjustment. Using a global, comparative analysis for the 1981–2000 period, we examine the effects of structural adjustment on government respect for citizens' rights to freedom from torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearances. The findings show that World Bank SAAs worsen government respect for physical integrity rights.

World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment conditions require loan recipient governments to rapidly liberalize their economies. According to previous research, these economic changes often cause at least short-term hardships for the poorest people in less developed countries. The Bank and IMF justify the loan conditions as necessary stimuli for economic development. However, research has shown that implementation of structural adjustment conditions actually has a negative effect on economic growth (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). While there has been less research on the human rights effects of structural adjustment conditions, most studies agree that the imposition of structural adjustment agreements (SAAs) on less developed countries worsens government human rights practices (Pion-Berlin 1984; McLaren 1988; Franklin 1997; Camp Keith and Poe 2000). This study focuses on the effects of structural adjustment conditions on the extent to which governments protect their citizens from extra-judicial killing, torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment.

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The results of this study suggest that existing theories of repression should be revised to take greater account of transnational causal forces. Previous studies examining variations in the human rights practices of governments have concentrated almost exclusively on state-level characteristics such as wealth, constitutional provisions, or level of democracy (e.g., Mitchell and McCormack 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1996; Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). The dominant theoretical framework underlying this research argues that, other things being equal, “repression will increase as regimes are faced with a domestic threat in the form of civil war or when a country is involved in international war” (Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith 1999; Poe 2002:293; see also Gurr 1986; Davenport 1995). Other international factors besides involvement in international war such as the degree of integration into the global economy, sensitivity to international norms, and involvement with international financial institutions have received much less attention.¹

Empirically, this study advances our understanding of the human rights consequences of structural adjustment by correcting for the effects of selection. It is possible that the worsened human rights practices observed and reported in previous studies might have resulted from the poor economic conditions that led to the imposition of the structural adjustment conditions rather than the implementation of the structural adjustment conditions themselves. In other words, the human rights practices of loan recipient governments might have gotten worse whether or not a structural adjustment agreement (SAA) had been received and implemented. In addition, as our results will show, some of the factors that increase the probability of entering into a SAA, such as having a large population and being relatively poor, are also associated with an increased probability of human rights violations. For these reasons one must disentangle the effects of selection before estimating the human rights impacts of structural adjustment loans. In order to control for the effects of selection, a two-stage analysis was undertaken. In the first stage of the analysis, the factors affecting World Bank decisions concerning which governments receive SAAs were identified. In the second stage the impacts of entering into and implementing SAAs on government respect for human rights were examined.

The first-stage results demonstrate that the Bank does give SAAs to governments that are poor and experiencing economic trouble, but the Bank also employs a wide variety of non-economic loan selection criteria. The non-economic selection criteria examined in the first stage of the analysis build upon and extend selection models developed in previous research on the economic effects of structural adjustment. This research project is the first to demonstrate that the Bank prefers to give loans to governments that provide greater protection for worker rights and physical integrity rights of their citizens. Earlier research had shown that democracies were at a disadvantage when negotiating a SAA from the IMF (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003), a finding consistent with expectations generated by Putnam’s (1988) theory of two-level games. Our findings provide evidence that democracies also are at a disadvantage when negotiating with the World Bank.

After controlling for selection effects and other explanations of respect for physical integrity rights, the findings of the second-stage analysis show that the net effect of World Bank SAAs is to worsen government respect for physical integrity rights. Torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearances were all more likely to occur when a structural adjustment loan had been received and implemented. Governments that entered into SAAs with the World Bank actually

¹ Some scholars have focused on transnational forces affecting human rights practices. For example, increased integration into the international economy has been associated with both worse (Meyer 1996, 1998) and better (Milner 2000; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001) protection of physical integrity rights by governments. Other studies have discussed the impacts of international nongovernmental organizations (Welch 1995) and even the diffusion of international norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Landman 2005) on the human rights practices of governments.

improved their protection of physical integrity rights in the year the loan was received. Governments then reduced the level of respect for the physical integrity rights of their citizens during the years when structural adjustment conditions were imposed. This combination of findings suggests that governments seeking loans from the World Bank initially improved their human rights practices, possibly to impress Bank officials. However, the austerity measures required by the implementation of structural adjustment conditions led to a subsequent worsening of human rights practices by governments in loan recipient countries.

The theoretical argument is that there are both direct and indirect negative effects of the implementation of structural adjustment conditions on government respect for physical integrity rights. Structural adjustment conditions almost always cause hardships for the poorest people in a society, because they necessitate some combination of reductions in public employment, elimination of price subsidies for essential commodities or services, and cuts in expenditures for health, education and welfare programs. These hardships often cause increased levels of domestic conflict that present substantial challenges to government leaders. Some governments respond to these challenges by becoming less democratic as in the case of Peru under President Fujimori in the 1980s (Di John 2005).² The results presented here, like those of numerous other studies, have shown that increased domestic conflict and decreased democracy are associated with higher levels of repression (e.g., Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith 1999). The case of Venezuela provides an illustration of the role of structural adjustment in producing increased domestic conflict, a weakened democratic system and repression. As Di John (2005:114) writes:

A few weeks after the announcement of [structural adjustment] reforms, Venezuela experienced the bloodiest urban riots since the urban guerrilla warfare of the 1960s. The riots, known as the "Caracazo," occurred in late February 1989. A doubling of gasoline prices, which were passed on by private bus companies, induced the outburst. . . . The riots that ensued were contained by a relatively undisciplined military response that left more than 350 dead in two days.

Although Venezuela's democratic system has been maintained, over the period of this study, dissatisfaction with economic policies has played a part in three attempted coups, multiple general strikes, two presidential assassination attempts, and has led to several states of emergency being imposed. Even today, debate over structural adjustment policies in Venezuela remains heated. President Hugo Chavez sustains his popularity largely based on his opposition to the kind of unregulated economic liberalization advocated by the IMF and the Bank (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2003).

The findings presented here have important policy implications. There is mounting evidence that national economies grow fastest when basic human rights are respected (Sen 1999; Kaufmann 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005). SAAs place too much emphasis on instituting a freer market and too little emphasis on allowing the other human freedoms necessary for rapid economic growth to take root and grow. By undermining the human rights conditions necessary for economic development, the Bank is damaging its own mission.

Background

While each structural adjustment program is negotiated by representatives of the Bank and representatives of the potential loan recipient country, common provisions include privatization of the economy, maintaining a low rate of inflation and price

² The Shining Path insurgency was another major factor increasing violations of physical integrity rights in Peru during the 1980s.

stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as close to a balanced budget as possible, eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods, getting rid of quotas and domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing state-owned industries and utilities, deregulating capital markets, making its currency convertible, and opening its industries and stock and bond markets to direct foreign ownership and investment (Meyer 1998). Good governance emphases of the Bank include eliminating government corruption, subsidies, and kickbacks as much as possible, and encouraging greater government protections of human rights including some worker rights (Sensor 2003; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005).

Most of the previous research has examined the IMF and its impacts, neglecting the role of the World Bank in promoting structural adjustment. Both are important actors, over the period examined in this study, the World Bank entered into 442 SAAs, while the IMF made 414.³ The remainder of the article briefly reviews previous work on the economic effects of structural adjustment, elaborates on the theory briefly outlined above, discusses the earlier research estimating the impact of structural adjustment on human rights; elaborates upon the need for a selection model, presents some specific hypotheses, and provides evidence supporting those hypotheses. Finally, the theoretical, methodological, and policy implications of these results are discussed.

The Economic Effects of Structural Adjustment

The purpose of structural adjustment programs is to encourage economic growth (e.g., Harrigan and Mosley 1991; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000). According to neoliberal economic theory, structural adjustment programs reduce the size and role of government in the economy. A minimalist state produces and encourages economic growth, which promotes economic and social development (Chenery and Strout 1966). Limited government empowers individuals by giving them more personal freedom, making it more likely that all individuals will realize their potential. The ability to realize one's potential, according to this line of reasoning, leads to individual responsibility and self-reliance. Limited government maximizes individual opportunities, limits the opportunity for corruption and releases talented people into the more efficient private sector (Friedman 1962).

Many scholars have examined the link between structural adjustment policies and economic growth and the weight of the evidence so far is that structural adjustment is not effective (Harrigan and Mosley 1991; Rapley 1996; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; van de Walle 2001; Vreeland 2003). According to critics, the Fund and Bank use a conception of development that is too focused on economic growth, have misdiagnosed the obstacles to development in less developed countries, have failed to appreciate the value of government interventions into the private economy, and have insisted that structural adjustment reforms be implemented too quickly (Stiglitz 2002). It is possible that developing countries like China have been more successful, both in terms of aggregate economic growth and poverty reduction, because they have avoided SAAs from the IMF and World Bank. Unlike Russia, which has received a number of SAAs, China has avoided a rapid increase in economic inequality (Stiglitz 2002).

Theory: The Human Rights Effects of Structural Adjustment

Direct Effects

Figure 1 depicts the main causal arguments of the conventional neoliberal and more critical views of the direct and indirect effects of structural adjustment on the human rights practices of governments. The direct effects may be theorized as

³ The IMF data comes from Vreeland (2003).




FIG. 1. Structural Adjustment and Human Rights: The Neoliberal Perspective

positive or negative. The “positive” argument (linkage “a”) is that a relatively limited government as required by SAAs is fundamental to all human freedoms. Limited government reduces barriers to the functioning of the free market, allowing people to enhance their opportunities and better pursue their own interests that are likely to be lost if human freedom is restricted (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1984). Consistent with this line of thought, Cranston (1964) has argued that respect for most human rights, including physical integrity rights (such as the right *not to be tortured*) only requires forbearance on the part of the state.

However, as linkage “h” of Figure 2 indicates, structural adjustment programs also may have the direct effect of worsening government human rights practices, because a substantial involvement of government in the economy is essential for the protection of all human rights (Donnelly 2003). The historical record demonstrates, for example, that a reduced role of the state in capitalist economies has led to less protection of some human rights such as worker rights. From a principal-agent theoretical perspective, reducing the size of government also reduces the ability of principals (government leaders) to constrain the discretion of agents (police and soldiers). More administrative discretion is likely to lead to greater abuse of physical integrity rights (Policzer 2004). Also, in practice, the acceptance of structural adjustment conditions by the governments of less developed countries causes the adoption of new policies and practices. These new policies are designed to produce substantial behavioral changes in the affected populations. Evidence from literature about human learning suggests that people have a natural tendency to resist making substantial changes in their previous behavior (Davidson 2002). One of the tools government may use to overcome such resistance is coercion.

The idea that liberalization and economic development may conflict with respect for some human rights is an enduring theme in the debate over development policy and an implicit element of structural adjustment packages. Loan recipient governments are expected to reduce their efforts to protect the social and economic




FIG. 2. Structural Adjustment and Human Rights: The Critical Perspective

rights of their citizens in a variety of areas such as housing, health care, education, and jobs at least in the short run, with the expectation that they will be able to make much larger efforts toward these ends later. Civil and political liberties may have to be curtailed in order to ease the implementation of loan conditions (Donnelly 2003:196–199). People opposed to the policies of structural adjustment such as members of the press, trade unionists, leaders of opposition parties, clergy, social activists, and intellectuals may then be subjected to abuse of their physical integrity rights.

Indirect Effects

Figure 1 also depicts the expected indirect effects of structural adjustment on the human rights practices of loan recipient governments. As noted, neoliberal economic theory suggests that structural adjustment will promote economic development (linkage “b” in Figure 1).⁴ Many previous studies (e.g., Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith 1999; Milner, Leblang, and Poe 2004) have shown that wealthier states have provided greater levels of respect for a wide variety of human rights including physical integrity rights (linkage “c”). Thus, if the imposition of a SAA increases the level of wealth in a less developed country, then the indirect effect of SAA implementation should be an improvement in the human rights practices of governments.

Despite findings showing that structural adjustment has not led to faster economic growth, the empirical debate over linkage “b” will continue. Thus, it is still important to understand the remainder of the neoliberal argument. As is indicated by linkages “d” and “e” in Figure 1, previous research has shown that wealthier states are more likely to be democratic (e.g., Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2003), and relatively high levels of democracy are associated with a higher level of respect for most human rights including physical integrity rights (Mitchell and McCormack 1988; Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Milner, Leblang, and Poe 2004). Therefore, if the imposition of a SAA promotes higher levels of democratic development through increased wealth, then an indirect consequence of SAA implementation should be an improvement in human rights practices.

Neoliberal defenders of the effects of SAAs on government respect for economic human rights have argued that higher levels of economic development caused by the implementation of a SAA will lead to improvements in government respect for economic rights (linkage “g”) through what is now commonly referred to as the “trickle down” effect. That is, wealth will accumulate faster under a structural adjustment program, and, once accumulated, will trickle down to help the less fortunate in society. A number of studies have shown that the level of economic development has a strong, positive impact on basic human needs fulfillment (Moon and Dixon 1985; Rosh 1986; Spalding 1986; Park 1987; Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999; Milner 2000; Milner, Leblang, and Poe 2004). Moreover, as indicated by linkage “f,” previous research has shown that democratic governments have been shown to make greater efforts to provide for the economic human rights of their citizens (Moon and Dixon 1985; Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999; Milner, Leblang, and Poe 2004).

Unfortunately, all of indirect neoliberal arguments linking SAAs to better human rights practices depend upon supporting evidence for linkage “b” in Figure 1. Without linkage “b” all of the other indirect causal chains from rapid economic liberalization to better human rights practices by governments are broken. At an earlier point in time, one might have argued that it was too soon to conclude that there was no evidence that the implementation of SAAs led to the accumulation of more wealth by loan recipients, but SAAs were initiated by the World Bank in 1980 and the IMF has had conditionality associated with its loans as far back as 1952

⁴ For a review of literature developing this argument, see Rapley (1996).

(Sidell 1988). If SAAs have had a stimulative effect on economic development, it should be observable by now.

The indirect effects posited by the critical perspective are summarized in Figure 2. There is a large body of research showing that implementation of a SAA has negative effects on government respect for economic human rights (linkage "i"). Rapid economic liberalization, according to many observers, forces loan recipient states to reduce or even stop making efforts to help their citizens enjoy internationally recognized rights to health care, education, food, decent work and shelter, because structural adjustment conditions almost always require reductions on government spending for social programs (World Bank 1992; Chipeta 1993; Sowa 1993; Handa and King 1997; Meyer 1998; Zack-Williams 2000; Fields 2003). Some studies have emphasized the disproportionate negative economic human rights consequences for women (Commonwealth Secretariat 1989; Elson 1990; Buchmann 1996; Sadasivam 1997), for public sector employees and low-wage workers (Daddieh 1995). The poor and those in the public sector have seen their wages fall in real terms (Munck 1994; Daddieh 1995), while at the same time they have faced increased living costs because of the removal of price controls and subsidies for essential commodities (Zack-Williams 2000). The implementation of SAAs also has worsened the relative position of the worst off by increasing income inequality (Daddieh 1995; Handa and King 1997; Friedman 2000).

Less attention has been given to the relationships explicitly linking the implementation of SAAs to subsequent government respect for physical integrity rights.⁵ As shown in Figure 2, there are three indirect causal paths that should be considered (linkages "j-k," "j-l-n," and "m-n"). All lead to less respect for physical integrity rights, and all depend upon empirical support for linkage "i," which is plentiful. One line of thinking is that, by causing loan recipients to reduce their respect for the economic human rights of their most vulnerable citizens, externally "imposed" rapid economic liberalization of the type required by a SAA promotes domestic conflict (linkage "j"), which, in turn, leads loan recipient governments to become more repressive (linkage "k"). Acceptance of SAA conditions requires that decision makers in loan recipient countries enact unpopular policies. These policies cause hardships, especially among the poorest citizens, who are most dependent upon social programs (Vreeland 2002). Citizens, often led by organized labor, protest against reductions in social welfare programs and public employment, commonly required in SAAs (Pion-Berlin 1983, 1984). Sometimes the protests become violent (Auyero 2001; Fields 2003). The adjustment process also has intensified regional and ethnic conflicts as groups compete for a "dwindling share of the national cake" (Zack-Williams 2000:64). Increased repression (linkage "k") by the recipient government is one tool by which it can deal with violent protest (Davenport 1995; Fields 2003). However, it is important to distinguish incremental economic liberalization that results from a societal choice without undue external interference and pressure from the kind of rapid economic liberalization required by SAA conditionality. Economic liberalization that is not required by the conditions found within a SAA may not affect or may actually reduce domestic conflict in societies. For example, Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) examine the impact of economic liberalization and find no discernible impact on the probability of civil conflict.

Other critics of structural adjustment would like the Bank and Fund to give greater attention to the impacts of SAAs on issues such as democratic development (Pion-Berlin 1984; Stiglitz 2002). Increased domestic conflict caused by the implementation of SAAs presents serious challenges to democratic systems (linkage "l"). Also, as indicated by linkage "m," requiring democracies to enact unpopular pol-

⁵ There is a large body of literature from a dependency theory perspective arguing that rapid economic liberalization can worsen government human rights practices. For an excellent review of this literature, see Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko (2001).

icies, the Bank and Fund may be undermining democratic systems (Haggard 1995; Fields 2003). The positive relationship between a state's level of democracy and its respect for all types of human rights (linkage "n"), as noted above, is well established in the literature. Thus, any policy that undermines democracy, undermines government respect for human rights.

Previous Research Linking Structural Adjustment to Human Rights Practices

The results of previous research explicitly focusing on the effects of SAAs on government respect for physical integrity rights are consistent with the expectations of the critical perspective (Franklin 1997; McLaren 1998; Camp Keith and Poe 2000; Fields 2003). Camp Keith and Poe (2000) evaluated the human rights effects of getting a SAA from the IMF by comparing the human rights practices of governments with and without such loans while controlling for other factors reliably associated with good or bad human rights practices by governments. They focused on a global sample of countries between 1981 and 1987, and found some evidence indicating an increase in the level of repression of physical integrity rights during the implementation of a SAA. Using a cross-sectional analysis, Franklin (1997) also found some support for the argument that governments implementing IMF agreements were likely to become more repressive.

Furthermore, Camp Keith and Poe (2000) hypothesized that the very act of negotiating or entering into a loan with the IMF would have a temporary negative impact on the human rights practices of loan recipients. They were not clear about the rationale for this hypothesis, and their findings provided no statistically significant evidence for a "negotiations effect." Others have argued that the involvement of international actors has a moderating effect on domestic conflicts (Grove 2001), which should have the effect of improving government respect for physical integrity rights. There also is a specific reason to expect that negotiating a SAA from the World Bank would have at least a temporary positive impact on the human rights practices of loan recipient governments. The U.S. International Financial Assistance Act in 1977 requires U.S. government representatives on the decision making boards of the World Bank and IMF to use their voices and votes to advance the cause of human rights in loan recipient countries (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004a). The size of U.S. contributions to the Bank gives it a strong voice in loan negotiations (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2003). Thus, one would expect the World Bank to make SAAs with countries that have good human rights practices.

Previous research has examined the effects of structural adjustment on the overall level of government respect for physical integrity rights but has not disaggregated the effects on torture, political imprisonment, extra judicial killing, and disappearances.⁶ However, it is likely that the impacts of negotiating and implementing a structural adjustment program affect government respect for these kinds of physical integrity rights in different ways. In this early stage of the research program designed to develop theories explaining the human rights practices of governments, aggregate measures may mask theoretically important variations in how governments respect the human rights of their citizens (McCormick and Mitchell 1997). Disaggregating the measures of respect for physical integrity rights allows the investigation of whether governments improve or decrease their respect for different types of physical integrity rights to the same extent as a result of making and implementing a SAA from the World Bank.

Existing theories explaining why governments resort to violent forms of political repression conceive of repression as the result of conscious choices by rational, utility maximizing political leaders (Poe and Tate 1994; Gartner and Regan 1996;

⁶ Camp Keith and Poe (2000), for example, used the five-point Political Terror Scale (PTS) to measure the degree of overall violation of those rights.

Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith 1999). Both the domestic and international costs and benefits of violating different types of physical integrity rights vary. Torture and political imprisonment are the most common forms of physical integrity rights abuse by governments (Cingranelli and Richards 1999a). If government decision makers are rational, then policies allowing for the practice of torture and political imprisonment must offer higher net benefits than policies allowing the police or military to make citizens disappear or to kill them without a judicial process. If repression is a rational response to structural adjustment, then torture and political imprisonment should increase the most during the implementation of structural adjustment conditions. Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been an increase in average worldwide government respect for the right against political imprisonment (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b). This trend indicates that, over time, either the costs associated with this form of repression have increased, the benefits have declined or both.

The Need for a Selection Model

Estimating the human rights effects of structural adjustment requires the use of a two-stage econometric model. As explained by Achen (1986), Heckman (1988), Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), and Vreeland (2002, 2003) issues of endogeneity, selection, and randomization must be accounted for when assessing the impact of any public policy. One needs to disentangle the impacts of the policy from any prior attributes that may also have an impact (Collier 1991). In the context of the present problem, one must be able to distinguish whether the negative effects on physical integrity rights practices found by McLaren (1988) and Franklin (1997), Camp Keith and Poe (2000), were the result of the economic difficulties that made the loan recipient country a good candidate for a SAA in the first place or were they the consequence of the SAA itself. Single-stage models cannot provide an answer to that question.

Single-stage models, like those used in previous cross-national studies of the impact of IMF conditionality on human rights practices also implicitly assume a unidirectional causal relationship. That is, structural adjustment loans affect human rights practices. More likely, human rights practices affect the probability of loan receipt, while loans affect human rights practices, which, in turn, affect the subsequent probability of loan receipt. Thus, both SAA receipt and human rights practices are mutually dependent or endogenous variables. Application of a single-stage model to estimate these theoretical relationships will generate inconsistent parameter estimates (Gujarati 1995). The methodological resolution to this conundrum is found in a variety of two-stage econometric models that disentangle the impact of these mutually dependent variables.⁷

Which Countries Enter into SAAs?

Through its public policy statements, the Bank has announced some of the criteria it uses to decide which governments should receive SAAs and which should not. The Bank's code of practice recommends that preference be given to applicants that are poor, have a capitalist ideology, have not nationalized private industry without providing fair compensation to the owners, are not able to borrow on the private market, and are creditworthy (Van de Laar 1980). These criteria created a bias against reaching agreements with communist countries, though some communist countries including the formerly communist Yugoslavia and Romania did receive them. In making its decisions, the Bank's Board of Directors must

⁷ Examples of selection models in research on human rights are rare. Blanton (2000) used a Heckman two-stage selection model to determine whether the promotion of human rights and democracy were important objectives affecting the decisions by the U.S. government to transfer arms abroad.

prioritize, sometimes among conflicting criteria, and operationally define terms such as “capitalist ideology” and “creditworthy.”

Conventional wisdom holds that governments accept structural adjustment conditions because they face economic difficulties and need an infusion of foreign capital.⁸ This means that they must sacrifice sovereignty over their economic policy (Bird 1996; Krasner 1999; Moyo 2001). There is significant disagreement over the roles of indicators of economic difficulty such as a large balance of payments deficit, while there is more agreement over the impact of other factors like lower foreign currency reserves, overvalued exchange rates, and negative changes in gross domestic product (GDP) which increase the probability of participation in structural adjustment programs (Vreeland 2003:12). Moreover, none of the purely economic explanations do a very good job of explaining participation in structural adjustment programs. Economic factors are part of the explanation of which governments receive SAAs, but they do not provide a complete picture.

Non-Economic Selection Criteria

Besides economic selection criteria, a variety of political, institutional, and social characteristics of potential recipient governments also affect the probability of reaching a SAA (Joyce 1992; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004a, 2005). The Bank's Board of Directors decides which governments receive World Bank loans. The World Bank uses a weighted voting system for determining which agreements are approved and which are denied. The weights assigned are roughly in proportion to the share of the Bank's development funds contributed by each of the member governments. For the last 25 years, the United States and Japan have been the largest contributors to the Bank (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2003), so it is reasonable to assume that the preferences of their country representatives have dominated the preferences of other members of the Bank's Board of Directors. World Bank representatives protest against any allegations that their lending policies are motivated by political considerations, but the internal decision making process of the World Bank privileges the ideological perspectives of some governments over others, allows for logrolling and vote trading, and in all other respects provides fertile ground for what, in any other context, would be called “politics.”

Despite this potential for politics, non-economic selection criteria have received relatively little attention. Some suggest that, unlike the IMF, the World Bank may prefer to work with governments willing to respect worker rights. Nelson (2000) contends that the Bank has in fact had a long-standing commitment to maintaining labor standards, because Bank officials believe that respect for three core labor standards—against child labor, forced labor, and discrimination in hiring and treatment at work—actually promotes economic growth (Sensor 2003). In contrast, others suggest that structural adjustment conditions provided indirect incentives to limit worker rights in order to make countries more competitive internationally. The establishment of export processing zones are encouraged by the World Bank (Klak 1996:358). In an effort to make these zones as competitive as possible, the governments of developing countries attempt to keep wages low (Klak 1996:358). Thus, labor loses out in order to make countries as attractive as possible to international investors. Research investigating these competing claims on a large-n comparative basis has found evidence that the Bank is more likely to enter into agreements with countries that have higher levels of respect for worker rights (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004a, 2005).

Another non-economic factor alleged to increase the probability of participation in World Bank structural adjustment programs is an alliance with the United States

⁸ For other explanations of participation by the governments of developing countries in structural adjustment agreements, see Vreeland (2003).

(Forsythe 1987). Recent work examining IMF selection criteria has argued that countries with policy preferences similar to key Fund contributors were more likely to receive preferential loan conditions (Stone 2004). By implication they also would be more likely to negotiate a SAA with the World Bank. Other work has found that being poor, having a large population (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004a, 2005), and the end of the end of the Cold War (Williams 1994; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2005) increase the probability of entering into a SAA. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a period when international institutions, including international financial institutions, began to play a larger role in international affairs. Involvement in international war and high levels of domestic unrest have been found to reduce the probability of loan receipt (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004a, 2005).

A Disadvantage for Democracies?

Several studies have found that more democratic governments were less likely to enter into SAAs (Pion-Berlin 1984; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). Putnam's (1988) theory of two-level games provides an explanation for the finding in the literature that the IMF prefers lending to authoritarian regimes. Putnam suggests that negotiations between an international agency like the World Bank or IMF and the leaders of a nation state can be thought of as a two-level negotiation game. Level I negotiation occurs between the leaders of the Bank and the leaders of the potential loan recipient country. Level II is played between the country leaders and their citizens. At level I, the leaders of the World Bank behave as autonomous, unitary actors in the model. At the risk of oversimplification, the preferences of the Bank are that decision makers in recipient countries agree to a set of economic reforms, these reforms be implemented faithfully, the economy of the recipient country improve, and the loans be paid back in a timely fashion (Williamson 1990).

Domestic opposition makes it harder to reach any agreement. Domestic opposition might arise as a result of interest group efforts and opposition political parties, electoral cycles, and even institutional arrangements requiring legislative approval of international agreements. Putnam (1988) contends that the greater the autonomy of country leaders at level I from influence by their level II constituents, the greater the likelihood of achieving an international agreement. At level I, the leaders of authoritarian states can negotiate with greater authority and independence from domestic forces at level II.

A bias against democracies in the selection processes of the World Bank is, thus, a predicted outcome of the model. Democratic leaders prefer not to lose the support of their constituents, and Bank leaders prefer not to give loans with conditions that may not be implemented by the loan recipient. There is a contrasting theoretical argument suggesting that democracies have an advantage when negotiating international agreements, because their governments can make more credible commitments (Leeds 1999; Martin 2000). According to this perspective, the properties of democratic accountability and institutionalized cooperation afford democracies the ability to send clear and credible signals concerning their ability and willingness to cooperate. Supporting this line of argument, Dollar and Svensson (2000) show that democratic governments are much more likely to fulfill the structural adjustment commitments they make to the World Bank.

Hypotheses

In order to test hypotheses about the human rights impacts of SAAs, one must first account for the effects of World Bank loan selection criteria. As noted, previous research suggests that economic, political, conflict, and human rights factors help

determine the probability of receiving a SAA and also impact subsequent human rights practices. Governments are more likely to enter into a SAA if they have:

- H1:** *Greater economic difficulty.*
- H2:** *Greater respect for the human rights of their citizens.*
- H3:** *An alliance with a major donor to the World Bank.*
- H4:** *Larger populations.*
- H5:** *Negotiated after the end of the Cold War.*
- H6:** *More authoritarian domestic institutions.*
- H7:** *Lower levels of domestic unrest.*
- H8:** *Lower levels of interstate conflict.*

Previous research also supports the following second-stage hypotheses concerning the human rights impacts of SAAs:

- H9:** *The level of respect for physical integrity rights increases during the year a SAA is negotiated (the negotiation hypothesis).*
- H10:** *The level of respect for physical integrity rights decreases during the years SAAs are implemented (the implementation hypothesis).*
- H11:** *The practices of torture and political imprisonment will increase more after entering into and implementing structural adjustment conditions than the practices of extra-judicial killing and disappearance (the differential effects hypothesis).*

Other studies have demonstrated that wealthier countries, more democratic countries, and countries with a British colonial experience tend to have governments that provide more respect for the physical integrity rights of their citizens. Countries with military governments, relatively large populations, relatively large population increases, high levels of domestic conflict, and involvement in interstate war tend to have governments that provide less respect for the physical integrity rights of their citizens (Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith 1999; Poe 2002). These factors will be included as control variables in the analysis.

Research Design

This study uses a cross-national, annual time-series data set comprised of all nations of the world having a population of at least 5,000,000 in 1981. The data span the time period from 1981 to 2000. During this period, the World Bank awarded a total of 442 SAAs to countries in our sample, with a GDP per capita as high as \$13,200. For this reason, the analysis includes all countries in the world, not just less developed countries. The unit of analysis is the country year. At the human rights impact stage we investigate whether entering into a SAA with the World Bank in a particular year or the implementation of those loan conditions in subsequent years have an impact on the probability of torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearances in loan recipient countries.

Entering into a World Bank SAA is both a dependent variable in the first stage of the analysis and an independent variable in the second stage. It is a dichotomous measure that indicates whether a country received a World Bank SAA or not in a particular year. It is coded "1" for the years an agreement was made and "0" for all other years. The authors gathered the information necessary for constructing this measure from correspondence with officials at the World Bank.

The measure of implementation of a World Bank SAA, an independent variable in the second stage, was generated by the authors. As most adjustment packages last for 3 years and the World Bank has determined that on average it takes 18 months for implementation to affect the economy, the results of the adjustment process should appear in years 2, 3, and 4 of the loan period (Jayarajah, Branson, and Sen 1996). For this reason, years 2, 3, and 4 after loan receipt were coded as "1" and otherwise as "0." It was assumed that entering into a SAA was followed by

implementation of the negotiated structural adjustment conditions—an assumption that is common in previous research examining the consequences of structural adjustment. However, using private World Bank records, Dollar and Svensson (2000) estimate that about one third of loan recipients do not fully implement the adjustment criteria demanded by the Bank so there is some variation in the effectiveness of implementation practices by loan recipient governments⁹ that could not be captured by the measure of implementation used in this study. Even so, there is no reason to believe that the cases “mistakenly” coded as “1” for implementation rather than “0” generates systematic error in the empirical analysis. The measurement error generated creates a bias toward a weaker relationship than might actually exist between implementation and human rights practices of governments, but does not affect the direction of the relationship observed. Another limitation is that there was no information available about the particular structural adjustment conditions associated with each loan. The implementation of some provisions may have had greater human rights impacts than others, but, except for details contained in intensive case studies, the specific conditions imposed on loan recipients are not matters of public record.

The human rights practices of governments are the dependent variables in the second stage. Four physical integrity rights from the Cingranelli and Richards ([CIRI] 2004) human rights data set were used as dependent variables—extra-judicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment, and torture. The sources of information used to develop this data set were the annual *U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* and Amnesty International annual reports. Each of the four physical integrity variables was coded on a three-part scale where 0 = frequent violations of the right (50 or more), 1 = some violations (1–49), and 2 = no violations. The correlations among the four physical integrity rights during the 1981–2000 period ranged from a low of 0.27 between torture and disappearances to 0.49 between disappearances and extra-judicial killing. Among the independent variables pairwise correlations indicate no problems of multicollinearity. The highest pairwise correlations are found between worker rights and democracy at 0.62 and GDP per capita and democracy at 0.48. The negotiation and implementation of SAAs are correlated at 0.35.

Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of the operationalization of the independent variables used in the first and second stages of the analysis. The measure of overall respect for physical integrity rights used in the first-stage analysis is the CIRI physical integrity scale, a nine-point scale, ranging from zero, indicating no respect for physical integrity rights, to eight, indicating full respect for those rights. The worker rights variable used in the first-stage equation also was taken from the CIRI data set. It measures government respect for freedom of association at the workplace, the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, the effective abolition of child labor, and acceptable conditions of work. This list is much the same as the International Labour Organization’s list of five core labor rights. This variable also was coded on a three-point scale as follows. Worker rights are (0) not protected by the government, (1) somewhat protected by the government, (2) protected by the government (Cingranelli and Richards 2004).

The theory of how structural programs affect the human rights practices of SAL recipients posits both direct and indirect effects. However, this research design only estimates the direct effects of negotiation and implementation of these programs while controlling for the effects of loan selection and other causal variables (e.g., level of democracy, level of economic development, and level of domestic conflict) in the theoretical model. This specification of the model is consistent with previous

⁹ Also, see Stone (2004).

TABLE 1. Operationalization of World Bank Selection (First Stage) Equation Variables

| | <i>Indicator</i> | <i>Source</i> |
|---------------------------------|---|---|
| Dependent Variable | | |
| Entering into a World Bank SAA | Dichotomous "1" If SAA received; "0" if not | Correspondence with World Bank |
| Independent variables | | |
| Economic | | |
| GDP per capita change | Percentage change in GDP per capita current U.S. \$ purchasing power parity (PPP) | World Bank: World Development Indicators CD-Rom (WDI) |
| Foreign currency reserves | Average government foreign reserves to reflect monthly imports | World Bank: WDI |
| Exchange rate value | Average annual official exchange rate local currency unit per US \$ | World Bank: WDI |
| GDP per capita | GDP per capita current U.S. \$ (PPP) | World Bank: WDI |
| International trade | Trade as a percentage of GDP | World Bank: WDI |
| Political | | |
| Alliance with the United States | Correlates of war (COW) alliance measure | COW Alliance dataset |
| Democracy | Democracy-autocracy measure | POLITY IV dataset |
| Military regimes | Type of regime: civilian or military | Banks (2002) |
| Population size | Logged midyear country population | U.S. Census: international data base |
| Cold War | Dichotomous, "0" before 1991; "1" if 1991 or Later | Banks et al. (2003) |
| Conflict proneness | 0 = no interstate conflict, 1 = 1,000 battle deaths or more | Strand et al. (2002) |
| Interstate conflict | Riots: any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force | Banks (2002) |
| Domestic unrest | | |
| Human rights | | |
| Respect for human rights | Mokken scale: killing, disappearances, torture, imprisonment | Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) (2004) |
| Respect for workers rights | 0 = not protected by Government, 1 = somewhat protected by Government 2 = Protected by Government | CIRI (2004) |
| Temporal dependence | | |
| Cubic splines | Beck et al. (1998) BTSCS method | |

SAA, structural adjustment agreement; GDP, Gross Domestic Product.

TABLE 2. Operationalization of Human Rights Practices (Second Stage) Equation Variables

| | <i>Indicator</i> | <i>Source</i> |
|--|---|--|
| Dependent Variable | | |
| Disappearances | 0 = occasional or frequent, 1 = none | Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) (2004) |
| Killings | 0 = occasional or frequent, 1 = None | CIRI (2004) |
| Torture | 0 = occasional or frequent, 1 = None | CIRI (2004) |
| Political imprisonment | 0 = occasional or frequent, 1 = none | CIRI (2004) |
| Independent variables | | |
| Implementation of structural adjustment agreement | Dichotomous, 1 for the 3 years following SAA receipt & 0 otherwise (constructed) | Correspondence with World Bank |
| Entering into World Bank structural adjustment agreement | Dichotomous | Correspondence with World Bank |
| Control variables | | |
| Economic | | |
| Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita | GDP per capita current U.S. \$ (PPP) | World Bank: world development indicators |
| Increase GDP per capita | Percentage increase in GDP per capita current U.S. \$ (PPP) | CD-Rom (WDI) World Bank: WDI |
| Political | | |
| Democracy | Democracy—autocracy measure | POLITY IV Dataset |
| Military regime | Type of regime: civilian or military | Banks (2002) |
| Population size | Logged midyear country Population | U.S. Census: International database |
| Population change | Percentage change in yearly population (constructed) | U.S. Census: International database |
| U.K. dependent/colonial experience | The decision rule of the most recent possessor is used to identify the relationships under examination. | Issues COW Colonial History Dataset |
| Conflict proneness | | |
| Interstate conflict | 0 = no interstate conflict, 1 = 1,000 battle deaths or more | Strand et al. (2002) |
| Domestic conflict | Ordinal level of civil conflict | Strand et al. (2002) |
| Temporal dependence | | |
| Cubic splines | Beck et al. (1998) BTSCS method | |

research examining the determinants of government respect for human rights. The results allow one to determine whether the effects of structural adjustment add to what has been explained by factors already examined in the literature. An alternate specification estimating indirect effects is possible, but beyond the scope of this study. Not estimating those indirect effects almost certainly leads to an underestimation of the total negative causal effects of structural adjustment on government human rights practices.

Bivariate probit was used to test the hypotheses. The bivariate probit model is a simultaneous equation, multivariate model, which runs two probit models at the same time as a system of equations (Greene 2003). It is an appropriate estimation technique in this case because, as noted, many of the factors affecting whether a country enters into a SAA also have been shown in previous research to impact government respect for physical integrity rights. The technique corrects for these endogenous effects allowing us to examine the impact of structural adjustment on government respect for physical integrity rights. Other estimation techniques such as two-stage least squares or instrumental probit were rejected because the assumptions of those models were seriously violated by our data. Another advantage of bivariate probit is that cubic splines can be used to deal with issues of temporal dependence in both stages (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). The use of cubic splines reduces the probability of creating biased parameter estimates, which is a potential consequence of lagging the dependent variable (Gujarati 1995).

The disadvantage of using a bivariate probit model is that it requires the use of a dichotomous dependent variable for both stages. This required collapsing the second stage dependent variables that originally had three values. Each physical integrity dependent variable was dichotomized. A value of "0" indicated at least one recorded violation of that particular human right with a value of "1" indicating no violations of that right during the year. In the tests of robustness section we examine the impact of structural adjustment on governments becoming frequent violators of these rights where a value of "0" indicates at least 50 violations of that particular human right and a value of "1" indicating less than 50 violations during the year.

An alternative that does not require collapsing the second stage dependent variable was to use logit at the first stage and ordered logit at the second. The two models would be linked by using predicted probabilities generated in the first stage as an independent variable in the second stage ordered logit model. This alternative approach was also employed but generated less efficient standard errors increasing the probability of both Type I and Type II errors (Greene 2003). Most important, the findings for all the second stage hypotheses were the same no matter which method of estimation or alternate specification of the dependent variable was used.

Results

The Single-Stage Results

As noted, the only other large-scale, comparative study of the impact of structural adjustment loans on the human rights practices of loan recipients utilized an ordinary least squares, single-stage, cross-sectional, time-series model (Camp Keith, and Poe 2000). Their model which examined annual data on 153 countries from 1980 to 1987, controlled for independent variables shown in previous research to affect the human rights practices of countries around the world (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith 1999). While the Camp Keith and Poe study examined the impact of IMF structural adjustment programs on human rights practices, one would expect similar human rights effects for World Bank structural adjustment programs. The dependent variable in their study was the Political Terror Scale

TABLE 3. Single-Stage Probit: The Impact of World Bank Structural Adjustment Agreements (SAAs) on Respect for Physical Integrity Rights 1981–2000

| <i>Respect for Physical Integrity Rights[†]</i> | <i>Negotiation of SAA</i> | <i>Robust Standard Error</i> | <i>Implementation of SAA</i> | <i>Robust Standard Error</i> |
|--|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Torture | 0.028 | 0.114 | – 0.218** | 0.092 |
| Political imprisonment | 0.075 | 0.1 | 0.051 | 0.08 |
| Extra judicial killing | 0.175* | 0.086 | – 0.126* | 0.07 |
| Disappearance | 0.204* | 0.092 | 0.069 | 0.076 |

* $p > |z| .05$, ** $.01$, *** $.001$. One-tailed test (splines to control for temporal dependence).

[†]For each of the human rights dependent variables a value of “1” indicates no violations of that right during the year, a value of “0” indicates at least one recorded violation of that right.

(PTS), a widely used aggregated, five-point measure of government respect for physical integrity rights. Their results indicated that, during the year of negotiation of a loan from the IMF, there was an improvement in the human rights practices of loan recipient governments, but the effect was not statistically significant. Thus, the authors rejected the negotiations hypothesis. However, they did find a worsening of respect for physical integrity rights during the years of implementation of IMF SAAs. This relationship between loan implementation and worsened human rights practices was significant at the .04 level of confidence, and, on the basis of this evidence, they accepted the implementation hypothesis.

For the purpose of comparison with their findings and to illustrate why a selection model is needed, Table 3 presents single-stage probit results of the impact of World Bank SAAs on respect for physical integrity rights over the 1981–2000 period. A positive coefficient between negotiation or implementation of a SAA and any of the dependent variables here and elsewhere in this analysis indicates an improvement in the human rights practices of a loan recipient government. Estimating an equation that included all of the independent variables listed in Table 2 generated these single-stage results. However, since this is just an illustration of the need for a two-stage model, only the eight relationships relevant to assessing the three human rights impact hypotheses (9, 10, and 11) are displayed in Table 3.

The results presented in Table 3 are strikingly similar to those presented by Camp Keith and Poe (2000) regarding the human rights impacts of IMF structural adjustment. The results for the practice of torture are identical—rejection of the negotiations hypothesis but acceptance of the implementation hypothesis. However, if one looks only at the effects of structural adjustment on extra-judicial killing, both the negotiations and implementation hypotheses are confirmed. If one looks only at disappearances, the negotiations hypothesis is confirmed, but the implementation hypothesis is rejected. To complicate matters even further, the probability that a government will engage in political imprisonment is shown to be unaffected by either the negotiation of a World Bank SAA or its implementation. The effects of structural adjustment on human rights are much clearer and more consistent after one has controlled for issues of selection by modeling the determinants of entering into a SAA, as the first stage of a two-stage analysis.

Two-Stage Results

Stage 1 Results: Entering into a World Bank SAA

Table 4 summarizes the first stage results from the bivariate probit model predicting which governments enter into SAAs with the World Bank. Bivariate probit models were estimated for each of the four different physical integrity rights. The dependent variable in the first-stage equation is a measure of whether a government entered

TABLE 4. Summary of First-Stage Results from Bivariate Probit Describing Which Countries Enter into SAA with the World Bank 1981–2000

| <i>Entering into SAA with World Bank</i> | <i>Direction of Coefficient</i> | <i>Number of Models Where Coefficients Significant at $p > z \geq .05$</i> |
|--|---------------------------------|--|
| Economic variables | | |
| GDP per capita | – | 4 |
| Exchange rate value | + | 2 |
| Average foreign currency reserves | – | 2 |
| Extent of international trade | – | 1 |
| Change in GDP per capita | + | 0 |
| Human rights | | |
| CIRI: physical integrity rights index | + | 4 |
| Level of respect: workers rights | + | 4 |
| International political variables | | |
| Log of population | + | 4 |
| Cold War | + | 4 |
| Alliance with United States* | + | 1 |
| Domestic political variables | | |
| Military regime | + | 1 |
| Level of democracy | – | 0 |
| Conflict proneness variables | | |
| Domestic unrest | – | 3 |
| Interstate conflict | – | 0 |
| Constant | – | 3 |

*Alliances with other major contributors to the Bank: Japan, France, and the United Kingdom were found to have an insignificant impact on the probability of entering into a Structural Adjustment Agreement in all four models. SAA, structural adjustment agreement; GDP, gross domestic product. Splines are included to control for temporal dependence.

into a World Bank SAA. The second-stage equation utilized each of the physical integrity rights included in the analysis. In Table 4 the findings of the four first-stage equations are summarized. Once again, a positive sign in column two of Table 4 indicates an increased likelihood of entering into a World Bank SAA. The third column of Table 4 indicates the number of models in which each selection criterion was shown to be statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence or higher.

As shown in the second column of Table 4 the signs of all the statistically significant coefficients in all four models summarized in Table 4 were always in the hypothesized direction. Thus almost all of the selection hypotheses received some support. The results provided substantial support for Hypothesis 1 that economic difficulty increased the probability of entering into a World Bank SAA. Countries with low foreign currency reserves, low GDP per capita, and overvalued exchange rates were more likely to receive such loans. However, having little international trade was found to be statistically significant in only one model predicting entering into a SAA.

The results shown in Table 4 also demonstrate that these economic criteria only tell a small part of the loan selection story. When making SAAs, the Bank considers non-economic attributes of recipients as well. There is strong support for Hypothesis 2 that the World Bank has been more likely to give loans to the governments of countries that protect the human rights of their citizens. The results indicate that greater levels of respect for physical integrity and worker rights increase the probability of governments entering into World Bank SAAs. These results are consistent with the “governance matters” initiative of the Bank in recent years (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005) and with the 1977 U.S. International Financial Assistance Act requiring the U.S. representatives on the Board of the Bank to use their votes and voices to advance human rights in loan recipient countries. Some attributes of the international political system have a significant impact on the

probability of entering into agreements with the World Bank. Hypothesis 3, that countries allied with the United States were more likely to receive SALs garners the least support, being statistically significant in only one of the models. As expected, countries with larger populations were more likely to enter into agreements (Hypothesis 4). Similarly, countries were more likely to enter into agreements after the end of the Cold War (Hypothesis 5).

Though all of the signs of the coefficients are in the predicted direction, these findings only give weak support to the idea that countries with authoritarian institutions had a greater probability of entering into SAAs with the World Bank (Hypothesis 6). Military regimes have had a slight advantage over civilian regimes in negotiating SAAs with the Bank, but this advantage was statistically significant in only one of the four models. The results concerning the effects of democracy presented in Table 4 show a consistent democratic disadvantage in negotiating SAAs from the World Bank, but all are statistically insignificant. While these tests provide little support for the democratic disadvantage hypothesis, as will be explained later, using an alternative measure of democracy as a test of robustness yielded results that provided greater support. The findings provided support for Hypothesis 7 that countries with lower levels of domestic unrest were more likely to enter into SAAs with the World Bank. However, no relationship was found between involvement in interstate conflict and entering into SAAs (Hypothesis 8).

The Second Stage Results: The Human Rights Impact of Structural Adjustment

The second human rights impact stage results in Table 5 show the selection corrected effects of SAAs on government respect for physical integrity rights. They show that during the year a government enters into a World Bank SAA, it is likely to reduce its use of torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing and disappearances, confirming Hypothesis 9, the "negotiations" hypothesis. All of these relationships are statistically significant at the .001 level of confidence. During the subsequent 3 years of World Bank SAA implementation, there is a high probability that torture, extra-judicial killing and disappearances will all increase, confirming Hypothesis 10, the "implementation" hypothesis. These relationships are all significant at the .01 or .001 level of confidence. The likelihood that the government will resort to more political imprisonment also increases, but this relationship is only statistically significant at the .11 level of confidence.

In general, the control variables at the second, human rights impact, stage behave as one would have expected given the results of previous research. More specifically, in every case where a control variable showed up as statistically significant in any of the four models examined, the sign was in the expected direction. Moreover, all of the control variables except for interstate conflict were statistically significant in at least one of the four bivariate probit models estimated. Greater government involvement in interstate conflict was not related to physical integrity rights violations examined in any of the second-stage equations.

The ρ statistic indicates the extent to which the error terms in the two equations were correlated. Significant correlation between the two equations indicates that there were unaccounted processes which impact both determinants of SAA receipt and respect for physical integrity rights. While the conceptual and empirical approach taken in this work represents a significant improvement in our understanding of these processes, the large and significant ρ coefficient indicates room for further theoretical development.

Model Predictions and Explanations

The results presented in Table 5 showed that negotiating a SAA had a positive effect while implementation had a negative effect on respect for all four measures of

TABLE 5. Bivariate Probit Models[†] of the Impact of Entering into World Bank SAA and its Implementation on the Respect for Torture, Political Imprisonment, Extra Judicial Killing, and Disappearances 1981–2000[‡]

| | <i>Torture</i> | <i>Standard Error</i> | <i>Political Imprisonment</i> | <i>Standard Error</i> | <i>Killing</i> | <i>Standard Error</i> | <i>Disappearance</i> | <i>Standard Error</i> |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Respect for physical integrity rights | | | | | | | | |
| Entering into World Bank SAA | 1.561*** | 0.194 | 1.176*** | 0.219 | 1.645*** | 0.064 | 1.689*** | 0.077 |
| Implementation of World Bank SAA | -0.289*** | 0.094 | -0.1 | 0.082 | -0.251*** | 0.06 | -0.175** | 0.067 |
| Control variables | | | | | | | | |
| Economic factors | | | | | | | | |
| GDP per capita | 0.00004*** | 0.000006 | 0.00004*** | 0.000007 | 0.0001*** | 0.00001 | 0.00009*** | 0.000009 |
| Percentage change in GDP per capita | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.0002 | 0.0004 | 0.0003 | 0.0005 | 0.0008 | 0.0005 |
| Domestic political factors | | | | | | | | |
| Democracy | 0.034*** | 0.006 | 0.064*** | 0.006 | -0.006 | 0.005 | -0.003 | 0.006 |
| Military regime | -0.025 | 0.152 | -0.168 | 0.143 | -0.206* | 0.102 | -0.092 | 0.108 |
| Log population | -0.142*** | 0.028 | -0.202*** | 0.026 | -0.162*** | 0.022 | -0.128*** | 0.023 |
| Percentage change in population | 0.006 | 0.035 | 0.041 | 0.027 | 0.019 | 0.02 | 0.023 | 0.02 |
| U.K. dependent/colonial experience | -0.034 | 0.086 | -0.006 | 0.081 | -0.013 | 0.071 | 0.153* | 0.075 |
| Conflict proneness | | | | | | | | |
| Interstate conflict | 0.126 | 0.109 | 0.008 | 0.101 | 0.008 | 0.087 | 0.08 | 0.089 |
| Civil conflict | -0.359*** | 0.089 | -0.278*** | 0.063 | -0.158*** | 0.05 | -0.272*** | 0.039 |
| Constant | 1.857*** | 0.451 | 3.01*** | 0.422 | 2.39*** | 0.352 | 2.294*** | 0.37 |
| Rho | -0.827*** | 0.074 | -0.707*** | 0.106 | -0.984*** | 0.009 | -0.975*** | 0.009 |
| N | 1918 | | 1918 | | 1918 | | 1918 | |

$p > |z|$ * .05, ** .01, *** .001.

[†]Only the second stages of each model are shown.

[‡]Models are estimated with robust standard errors with one tailed significant tests, splines are included to control for temporal dependence. SAA, structural adjustment agreement; GDP, gross domestic product.

physical integrity rights. Thus, it was possible that the net effects were negligible. Table 6 shows that entering into SAAs and implementation of structural adjustment conditions had the net effect of increasing the probability that all four physical integrity rights would be violated. It also provides some support for the differential effects hypothesis and shows that the two-stage model presented has considerable explanatory power. Columns I and II in Table 6 present the predicted probabilities of torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearances occurring in countries that did not enter into or implement a SAA in a particular year in comparison with the probabilities of violations of those rights when loans were entered into and implemented. Column III shows the absolute change in probability that each right would be violated as a result of entering into and implementing an agreement. The probabilities listed in columns I and II were calculated holding all other independent variables included in the analysis at their mean or modal values. Thus, for example, *ceteris paribus*, the probability that torture would occur in a country in a year when a SAA was *neither* entered into nor implemented was 5%. The probability that torture would occur in a year when a SAA was entered into and implemented was 31%. As column III indicates, this represents an absolute increase of 26% in the probability of torture taking place.

The differential effects hypothesis posited that the effects of structural adjustment would be greatest on torture and political imprisonment, the most common forms of abuse of physical integrity rights, and that it would be smallest on extra-judicial killing and disappearances, the less frequent forms of abuse. The information contained in column III provides weak support for this hypothesis. As expected, governments that entered into and implemented SAAs substantially increased the use of torture. However, the practice of political imprisonment did not increase much more than the practice of extra-judicial killing.

The coefficients presented in column IV of Table 6 also indicate that all four models have substantial explanatory power. In work using linear regression models, a measure like “adjusted R^2 ” is often used as a summary measure of the model’s explanatory power. Following Long’s (1997:106–109) suggestions for evaluating the explanatory power of models with binary dependent variables, the percent of reduction in error of prediction based on the largest marginal (adjusted count R^2) is reported instead. This measure assesses the proportion of correct predictions a model produces. It is an improvement over previous measures like count R^2 , which can give a faulty impression of a model’s predictive abilities, since in a model with a binary outcome it is possible to correctly predict at least 50% of the cases by simply choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases (Long 1997:107). The adjusted count R^2 accounts for this possibility, and produces a result that is the “proportion of correct guesses beyond the number that would be correctly guessed by choosing the largest marginal” (Long 1997:108).

Examining column IV of Table 6 shows that the models reduced the errors in prediction for the practices of torture and political imprisonment by 39% and 26%, respectively. This is the best indication of the substantial power of the models presented. The practices of disappearances and extra-judicial killing are relatively rare occurrences. Thus, one of the marginals in each case is very large. For this reason, the models reduced the errors of prediction based on the largest marginal for disappearance and extra-judicial killing by lesser amounts—10% and 3%, respectively. While not shown in Table 6, the models also reduced the error in predicting selection into SAAs with the World Bank by 23%.

Tests of Robustness

The findings for the two-stage bivariate probit models inform us about the impact of entering into and implementing a SAA on the probability of *at least one* recorded violation of each of the four physical integrity rights. However, they do not tell us if

TABLE 6. Predicted Probabilities and Explanatory Power of Models: World Bank Structural Adjustment and Physical Integrity Rights Violations 1981–2000

| <i>Respect for Physical Integrity Rights</i> | <i>Column I Probability of Human Rights Violation Occurring if SAA is Not Entered into or Implemented (%)</i> | <i>Column II Probability of Human Rights Violation Occurring if SAA is Entered into and Implemented (%)</i> | <i>Column III Absolute Change in Probability of Violation Because of Entering into SAA and Implementation (%)</i> | <i>Column IV Percent Reduction in Error of Prediction Based on Largest Marginal (%)</i> |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| Torture | 5 | 31 | 26 | 39 |
| Political imprisonment | 5 | 22 | 17 | 26 |
| Extra-judicial killing | <1 | 18 | 17.9 | 3 |
| Disappearance | <1 | 16 | 15.9 | 10 |

SAA, structural adjustment agreement.

SAAAs increased the probability of governments becoming *frequent* violators of human rights. In order to examine this question, an alternate measure of the dependent variable was constructed, where a value of "0" indicated frequent violations of a particular right and a value of "1" indicated occasional or no violations. The findings yielded by this alternative measure mirrored those presented in Table 5. Entering into agreements *reduces* the probability of being classified as among the worst violators across each different type of physical integrity right. However, when governments implement SAAAs the probability of becoming classified as among the worst violators *increases* across each measure of the government respect for physical integrity rights.

The negative effects of structural adjustment on human rights practices also was found using the PTS as a measure of overall respect for physical integrity rights. The PTS scale runs from 1 through 5 where 1 indicates the best human rights conditions and five indicates the worst. Two different break points were analyzed. The first test dichotomized the PTS so values of 1, 2, 3 = "1" with values of 4, 5 = "0." This measure separates the worst human rights offenders from the others. Using this break point, receipt significantly increased the probability of better human rights practices, while implementation significantly worsens the situation. If we dichotomize the PTS scale where values of 1, 2 = "1" and 3, 4, 5 = "0," isolating the situations where most human rights are respected from the others the findings are consistent, but weaker. Receipt significantly increases the probability of better human rights practices, while implementation worsens the situation but is not significant.

Interstate conflict remained an insignificant predictor of both entering into a SAA and of government repression of physical integrity rights regardless of the alternative measures used. Instead of the scale indicating whether an interstate conflict with at least 1,000 battle deaths occurred, a dummy variable indicating an interstate conflict when there were 25 or more battle deaths was specified. Even with this much lower threshold than the usual 1,000 battle deaths, interstate conflict was an insignificant predictor at both stages of the model.

Using a different measure of democracy produced more support for the democratic disadvantage hypothesis. First, the 0–20 point democracy–autocracy variable was replaced with a 0–10 democracy measure taken from the POLITY IV data set.¹⁰ The previous democracy–autocracy measure had generated coefficients that were in the hypothesized direction, but insignificant in all models predicting entering into a SAA. The 0–10 measure also showed that more democratic states were disadvantaged in their negotiations with the World Bank and was significant at the .05 level or higher in two out of the four models. After also dropping the variable measuring whether a government was military or civilian from the first-stage equation, a democratic disadvantage in entering into a SAA was found in all four models at the .05 level of confidence or higher. On the basis of these additional tests, the democratic disadvantage hypothesis should be accepted.

The finding that domestic unrest was a significant factor predicting entering into a SAA also was sensitive to alternative measures. The original operationalization, which recorded the number of annual riots within a country was replaced separately with instances of guerrilla warfare, demonstrations and strikes, all taken from the Banks (2002) Cross National Times Series data set. Each alternative measure was found to be an insignificant predictor of entering into a SAA in three of the four models. These additional tests weaken our confidence in the domestic unrest selection hypothesis.

¹⁰ For an analysis of the relative merits of the two measures see Gleditsch and Ward (1997).

Discussion

The most important substantive finding of this study is that receiving and implementing a SAA from the World Bank had the net effect of worsening government respect for all types of physical integrity rights. This finding is generally consistent with the findings of previous comparative and case study research on the human rights effects of IMF SAAs. It supports one of the main hypotheses in our research—that there would be a higher probability of physical integrity rights violations during the years a SAA was implemented. It is stronger, but generally supportive of the finding reported by Camp Keith and Poe (2000) regarding the effects of IMF structural adjustment conditions. The direction of our findings for political imprisonment were consistent with this hypothesis but were only statistically significant at the .11 level of confidence. It was hypothesized that the practices of torture and political imprisonment would be most affected by entering into and implementing SAAs. While the results did not provide strong support for this “differential effects hypothesis,” the variation in the effects of SAAs across the four dependent variables examined did illustrate the usefulness of using disaggregated measures of physical integrity rights violations as advocated by McCormick and Mitchell (1997). Consistent with Putnam (1988), the findings also indicated that democratic governments had a disadvantage in negotiating SAAs with the Bank.

These findings concerning the effects of World Bank structural adjustment conditions on the human rights practices of loan recipients, with small differences, also pertain to the effects of negotiating and implementing a SAA with the IMF. In separate tests we have examined the impact of IMF conditionality and the joint effects of structural adjustment loans by the IMF and/or the World Bank (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004b, 2004c). No matter how the structural adjustment intervention is operationalized, the net effects on government human rights practices are found to be negative. We do not present all of those results in this paper mainly because of space limitations. However, there is also a void in the literature concerning the World Bank. While there have been numerous studies of the economic impacts of SAAs issued by the IMF, and Camp Keith and Poe (2000) and Franklin (1997) have conducted research on the human rights impacts of the IMF, there has been no previous global, comparative, cross-national research on the economic and human rights impacts of SAAs issued by the World Bank. As the number of SAAs issued by the World Bank and the IMF has been about the same over the period of this study, both international financial institutions have been about equally important in promulgating structural adjustment reforms. This paper, by focusing on the World Bank, begins to redress an unjustified imbalance in the literature.

Though it is clear that structural adjustment policies have negative human rights consequences for loan recipients, these bad outcomes probably have been unintended. First, the World Bank has been public in its commitment to good governance, including good human rights practices, as a way to promote economic development (Kaufmann 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005). Second, the selection stage findings indicated that the Bank has been more likely to give loans to governments with relatively good records of protection of physical integrity rights and worker rights. Third, the loan selection practices of the World Bank were not found to be strongly affected by the political interests of the major donors. Having an alliance with the United States or another major donor to the Bank had little effect on whether or not a country received a loan. Fourth, the findings showed that human rights practices improved during the years new SALs were negotiated. One might infer that these improvements were designed to please Bank officials. Finally, there is no evidence that suggests that the Bank is aware of the negative human rights effects of structural adjustment.

In fact, in some very public ways, the World Bank has seemed concerned about advancing human rights, especially in recent years (Blackmon 2005). James

Wolfensohn, in speeches he gave as the former World Bank President, even came close to using a human rights framework in his discussion of the poverty reduction efforts of the Bank (World Bank 2005). This evidence of concern about human rights can be seen elsewhere in the Bank's activities. Since 1994, the World Bank's Governance Project has emphasized the role of good governance as a precondition for development. The Director of the Project has even argued that respect for human rights is a necessary condition for economic growth (Kaufmann 2004). However, despite this apparent concern about promoting good human rights practices, the World Bank continues to use the tool of structural adjustment as its principal way to promote economic development, and there is no evidence that the provisions of the SAAs negotiated by the World Bank have changed in recent years or are different from those negotiated by the IMF.

The contributions of this study are theoretical and empirical, while the findings have important policy implications. This study contributes to efforts to build a theory of repression by providing additional evidence that transnational forces such as globalization and transnational actors including international financial institutions affect the human rights practices of governments. In contrast, previous studies have focused mainly on state-level characteristics such as their wealth or level of democracy. The results of this study also provide evidence supporting the critical theory argument that rapid, externally imposed economic liberalization does not stimulate economic development and worsens government human rights practices.

Empirically, this study makes several contributions. This is the first large scale comparative study to examine the human rights impacts of World Bank structural adjustment agreements, and the time period examined in this work (1981–2000) nearly triples the time period examined in any other study of the human rights effects of structural adjustment. It is also one of the few studies that disaggregate the analysis of government respect for physical integrity rights. Cubic splines were used to account for temporal dependence. Perhaps, most important, the relationship between structural adjustment and respect for physical integrity rights was reconceptualized to recognize that some of the factors which affect the likelihood of entering into a SAA also affect government human rights practices. This reconceptualization led to the use of a two-stage equation model to correct for the World Bank's selection criteria when estimating the human rights consequences of structural adjustment. The empirical results of the two-stage model differed from the single-stage results in important ways. The single-stage findings did not provide much support for either the neoliberal or critical theoretical perspective. The two-stage results provided strong support for most of the findings of the case study literature and for the critical theoretical perspective that provides the foundation of most of that work.

When coupled with the body of research showing that structural adjustment programs do not stimulate economic growth (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003), the findings presented here cast serious doubt upon the wisdom of insisting upon rapid neoliberal structural adjustment as the main condition for providing loans. The Bank's structural adjustment policies were shown to lessen the four human freedoms examined in this study. Most likely, protecting these and other human freedoms is critical to the promotion of economic growth (Sen 1999; Kaufmann 2004). Thus, structural adjustment programs as presently conceived and implemented undermine the Bank's mission to alleviate poverty around the World, and instead generate conditions for its perpetuation. Besides expanding market freedom, the World Bank should insist upon improvements in respect for other human rights as a condition for receiving new structural adjustment loans.

Future research on the human rights effects of structural adjustment should examine the consequences for other types of human rights such as worker rights and women's rights. Future work also should focus on developing improved measures of structural adjustment loan implementation. New measures would allow for

a closer examination of the direct and indirect effects of the speed and types of economic liberalization on democratization, domestic conflict and ultimately on government respect for human rights. Economic liberalization may not have inevitable negative consequences for the human rights practices of governments. However, the results of this research demonstrate that the rapid, externally imposed economic liberalization of the type insisted upon by the World Bank has led to increased government violations of physical integrity rights.

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Rethinking peace education

Alicia Cabezudo and Magnus Haavelsrud

Introduction

This chapter will discuss three components within which major choices are made in designing peace education practice. Peace education will be discussed in terms of its content and communication form in relation to the contextual conditions within which the educational action takes place. Choices made in these two components are decisive in defining the substance of any education – including education for peace. Differing conceptions of the substance of peace education are related to the implicit or explicit choices made within each component.

The history of peace education shows differing opinions concerning which principles should guide the selection of content and also which principles should guide the selection of methods of learning and teaching. In the following, principles of content selection and form preferences are discussed separately before they are seen in relation to each other and in relation to contextual conditions. It is to be expected that selected content and form are very much related to specific contextual conditions for the simple fact that some contextual conditions exclude the possibility of selecting specific contents and forms. It is therefore important to keep in mind that peace education is not limited to formal systems of education but also to informal education in the home and non-formal education in various voluntary organizations. So contents and forms may be quite different in these three educations depending upon contextual conditions. What may be impossible in the formal system may very well be possible in the home and in the non-formal sector including adult education. This realization is central to the field of political socialization, which has demonstrated how political preferences are developed in the home and in the school – sometimes with very discrepant results (Haavelsrud 1999: 55–80).

It seems obvious that participatory peace education of the kind we are going to discuss here presumes some fundamental rights and guarantees, i.e. democratic contextual conditions must prevail in order to secure that peace education occurs in relation to its role of creating social change. Therefore links between content, form and contextual conditions will be discussed as an integral process for setting adequate learning conditions that lead to social transformation.

Participation and democracy are described together as a challenging scenario where society must perform if it wishes to implement political, social and economic processes which lead to

peace learning. Therefore peace education is to define a vision which will allow the setting of a course to be steered and collective objectives to be identified. There are twin objectives upon this happening: democratic society defines the dream it wishes to become a reality and it motivates actors to explore ways of making this come about. That is to say peace education in action.

Searching for the content in peace education

It is necessary to define what peace is in order to discuss the content of peace education. The following three approaches (Haavelsrud 1991) towards the discussion of the concept of peace are made in order to better understand the principles from which content may be selected. First, peace is seen in terms of what it is and what it is not. Peace is seen as the opposite of violence and three forms of violence are discussed, viz. direct, structural and cultural. Secondly, the concept of peace is discussed in relation to different levels, ranging from the individual to the global or expressed in another way: in terms of close, intermediate and distant realities as seen from the perspective of the individual. Third, peace is seen as a relatively permanent structure which enhances peace values but also as a process of interaction within structures which might be more or less peaceful or violent.

Content related to negative and positive peace

The idea that peace as the absence of war and/or any other form of organized physical violence has a long history and is quite predominant in common sense definitions of peace. The idea has also been incorporated into scientific definitions. Negative peace seems easy to exemplify and define. Negative peace certainly applies to cases where there is an absence of war between nations and civil war within a nation.

Positive peace is when social justice has replaced structural violence. In contrast to negative peace, positive peace is not limited to the idea of getting rid of something, but includes the idea of establishing something that is missing. While getting rid of structural violence or social injustice, positive peace implies the presence of social justice. Galtung has defined structural violence as the distance between the actual and the potential. This definition allows for many interpretations based on differing opinions about what is actual and potential. And such subjective understandings of present as well as future realities are important to recognize in peace education content.

On the other hand, scientific research can greatly help to transcend the level of subjective opinion about what 'is' (in existence) and what 'could be' (potential). The scientific monitoring of human society produces systematic studies of the quality of life in any given society. Thus, we have data on drop-outs from school, infant mortality, unemployment, social security recipients and juvenile crime. Social science research also shows how conditions of life vary from nation to nation and across social groups within one nation. Such empirical data on actual conditions are seen in the light of social theories which, to varying degrees, help explain the causes of such empirical findings.

Thus, our knowledge of the actual constitutes a large body of research. In contrast to the great emphasis in social science upon problems of the actual, our knowledge of the potential is less extensive. Questions about what 'could be' have not been dealt with in social science to the same degree as what is actually in existence.

This first approach in searching for the content of peace education points towards the importance of understanding the consequences in human suffering from both direct and structural violence. It is apparent that both types of violence often produce the same results in terms of death and human suffering. In a sense, one might argue that direct violence is worse than structural violence because its victims are often people who are not directly involved in any manifest conflict, but who are at the receiving end of a global structure of violence which oftentimes is hidden to its victims. This first approach in searching for the content of peace education also poses questions about the relationship between direct and structural violence and how they interact in support of each other.

The study of violence is an important part of the content of peace education. Hiding violence in pedagogical work will serve to legitimate it and make it difficult to develop an understanding of the causes of violence, including the cause that pedagogical preferences might conceal the study of violence and its causes. This latter phenomenon is an example of cultural violence – a third type of violence especially relevant to education as this education itself could be violent if it helped legitimate direct and structural violence. All cultural agencies in a society, including education to varying degrees, may choose to expose issues of peace and violence (religious institutions, mass media, universities, schools, etc.).

Content from micro- and macro-levels

In this second approach in discussing the concept of peace in the search for the content of peace education, Figure 18.1 is useful.




Figure 18.1. Relationships in time and space (Haavelsrud 1996: 55)

The space axis is horizontal and the time axis is vertical. Their crossing point illustrates the 'here and now context' of each individual. This context is constantly changing as time progresses and as situations outside the 'here and now' develop. The figure thus puts each individual in the centre of time and space.

Time can be visualized in terms of the past, the present and the future. The past is indefinite and so is the future. The present may be defined in terms of measurable time such as seconds, hours, days, weeks or months. The limits of 'the present' may be drawn by individuals in reference to events such as change of location (e.g. moving from home to school), change of activity (e.g. getting up in the morning means to change one's behaviour (from sleeping to eating breakfast) or change of social context (e.g. a guest arrives or leaves). 'The present' may also be a moment of *kairos* (Galtung 2004) in which only a few moments may seem like an eternity (e.g. waiting to get out of a catastrophic situation or a moment of deep love).

Departing from such 'now' contexts, the time axis stretches towards the past as well as the future. In Figure 18.1, three points in both directions are indicated to illustrate that time can be seen in terms of its distance to each individual, viz. close, intermediate and distant. The two arrows along the time axis illustrate causality over time. The arrow pointing upwards illustrates that the context at one time will influence the context at a later time. The arrow pointing downwards illustrates the idea behind the self-fulfilling prophecy: expectations, aspirations, hopes and visions of the future influence human behaviour at earlier time points (e.g. visions of the future influence our present tactics or strategies for transforming the present towards our visions).

The extreme left is the position of the individual, and the arrow pointing to the right signifies indefinite space in physical terms. As human life (with only a few exceptions) is limited to our planet, the crossing point of the outer circle and the space axis points out the physical limits for global society. Thus, this point represents planet earth in physical terms and the social, cultural, economic and political characteristics of global human society.

The arrow pointing to the left along the space axis illustrates the influence of society upon individuals living in it. The arrow pointing to the right along the space axis illustrates the fact that society is a human product. Thus, the figure points out that there is a dialectical relationship between world society and each individual. Each individual is involved in an everyday context which has linkages to contexts that are outside this context. 'Outside' contexts have been called intermediate and distant realities in the figure.

Space can be measured in physical terms (e.g. metres and kilometres) but also in terms of societal dimensions, such as social, cultural, economic and political realities. As we know, there is a great variation in these realities from context to context. Each individual is closely interwoven with specific realities and distantly separated from others. Whatever dimensions are used, everyday reality of individuals and groups varies in terms of social, cultural, economic and political facts. In a comparative perspective, specific realities can be seen in terms of their similarity or dissimilarity with other realities.

Although dissimilarity between everyday contexts seems to increase as a function of physical distance, there is no simple relationship between physical distance and type of social, cultural, economic and political characteristics of two or more everyday contexts. In one and the same geographical location, e.g. in a large city, there may be greater dissimilarities between two contexts than between two locations on different continents. Thus, there may be more corresponding characteristics between the contexts of upper-class families in New York and London than between these two contexts and the contexts of poor families in Harlem and East London. The latter pair may have more in common with each other than with their upper-class counterparts in the same city.

In this discussion on how micro and macro realities find their place in the content of peace education it is important to keep in mind that each specific and everyday context in which people are in direct interaction with each other has certain links to the higher levels of some society which has, in its turn, certain social, cultural, economic and political characteristics. This is illustrated by the space axis in the figure. Everyday contexts are embedded in larger and political contexts.

When time and space are seen together, it becomes apparent that there are possible causal chains arriving at each individual from any time in the past and future and from any place along the space axis. In turn, there are possible causal chains departing from each individual to any point in the future. This possible influence is not restricted to the individual's own future, but includes the future of society and of the world. Thus, the individual can potentially influence the future world as well as any part of it. Thus the area of influence lies in the area above the space axis, i.e. in the future. Past and present have already been created and cannot be changed. Only our understanding of the past and present realities can change, not the realities themselves.

As the past interactions among individuals, social groups and institutions have created present society, it seems clear that one important relationship is that macro produces micro. If micro contexts can be seen as resulting from the macro contexts, one might argue that macro is in micro. This means that every time direct, structural or cultural violence is manifested in a specific close reality it is more than probable that causes of this violence are to be found outside that micro reality.

This leads to the impact of micro upon macro. The characteristics of the larger context are dependent upon the existence of similar characteristics in the micro context. Without the existence of attitudes, opinions and valuations among people at large in the multitude of micro contexts in everyday life, the idea of gender equality, for instance, would simply be an abstract idea without any roots in people's existence. Such roots in the micro are a necessary condition for the continual maintenance of the characteristics of the larger macro society. Thus, the trunk, branches and leaves of the societal tree would fade away without the support of energy flowing through the roots. In this sense, each small root is a mediator of the energy necessary for the tree as a whole to continue its existence. In other words, micro produces macro. This production can be limited to reproduction, but it can also be production (or creation) when new roots are established from seeds that have fallen off the old tree. In both cases, one might argue that the influence of micro upon macro is such that micro is present in macro.

The content of peace education may be found in all contexts because violence as a phenomenon is not isolated to only some everyday realities. Some everyday realities have more violence than others but oftentimes the search for the causes of violence in one specific everyday reality may have to be done in other everyday realities. The specific manifestation of violence (direct, structural and cultural) in the everyday life of people is therefore part of the content of peace education. But the content stretches to other close realities where the causes of this violence may originate. The links of violence between one close reality and another are to be traced in the search for that content. The concept of peace is relevant to all times and all places (contexts). If peace is limited to a specific time and context (place), the result would be that the relationships between micro and macro as suggested above would be excluded from consideration. Such exclusion might lead to a distorted view of peace, because it is more and more difficult if not impossible to find a context which is completely isolated from the rest of the world. Just like weather systems develop in constant interplay with each other, it would seem that the content of peace education would have to open up for both micro and macro perspectives in the perception of violence in micro realities and the search for the causes of this violence. Without

such thorough diagnosis of the problem, is it going to be possible to develop content about a realistic vision of peace and the road towards this vision?

Content about peace as structure and process

A third way of searching for the content of peace education is to see peace as a structure as well as a process. A peace structure is by definition a structure that has institutionalized values of peace, i.e. absence of violence and presence of social justice, participation and diversity. Just like any building, its basic features would allow for certain interactions and make other interactions difficult or impossible. To stick with our example from architecture, one extreme type of building might be the one that is designed for individualism. This building would have no common rooms and each individual unit would be separated from the others. The singles condominium might be the closest example in the real world. Another extreme might be the commune, which is designed according to the value of collectivism. This structure would have large areas for common experiences and few, if any, rooms for individual or private activity. In between, there are all kinds of structures that allow for certain interactions and exclude others. A most common structure is the core family home.

A structure is taken to mean the presence of relatively permanent relations between specific units (Mathiesen 1981). The units can be any social actors ranging from the individuals and groups on the micro-level to the nations and transnational organizations such as the UN on the macro-level. A structure for peace would be a structure that enhances peace values, both those values that enhance negative peace (absence of direct violence) as well as those values that affirm peace (social justice, participation and cultural diversity). In order to test whether a specific structure secures peace, an investigation of the interactions among two or more units within the structure is necessary. Looking closer at interactions of this kind it is possible to find out the extent to which the values of peace are realized over time. If peace values are strengthened, we are witnessing a peace process.

As the discussion on peace as structure has already shown, a structure is defined in terms of interaction over time between specific units. The structures established through interactions can be maintained or changed through new interactions. Therefore, a non-peaceful structure can be changed to a peaceful structure through new interactions. Such peaceful interactions can occur within a non-peaceful structure. If such peaceful interactions are allowed to develop over time into new patterns, they will in the end become structures of peace within the overall structure of non-peace. At this moment, the new structures may be so powerful that their confrontation with the violent structure may lead to an overall peaceful structure. The opposite might also be the result, viz. repression of the peaceful structure by the violent structure.

History is abundant with examples of such processes. Actually, it seems that most interactions based on the value of independence and autonomy during the decolonization period have led to new structures that in the end were successful in dismantling the status quo. Today, we are witnessing liberation movements on the part of women, ethnic minorities, groups suffering from human rights violations, the working class and the poor all over the world. Such interactions among various groups are often based on values of peace and have started as interactions among members of these groups beyond the control of those in power. Such interactions will, if continued over time, involve more and more people, and in the end become structures of peace confronting existing violent structures.

In searching for the content of peace education, it is important to consider peace as both a structure or a building as well as a process. A peace structure means the presence of relatively

permanent relations between structural units that enhance peace values. The idea of ‘relative permanence’ implies that peace is a structure, as opposed to a process. But peace is also the process of interaction between specific units as long as the interaction is geared to the enhancement of peace values.

Communication form in peace education

In Figure 18.2, the integration of the world of practice and the world of reflection is highlighted. Everyday life may be characterized by habitual behaviours adapting to contextual conditions that may be both violent and nonviolent. The embodiment of oppressive elements in such habitual behaviour is one factor that sustains the oppression. Cultural preferences in everyday life may support violence and inhibit peace. At the same time, cultural preferences are part of the identity of the person and can only be changed according to the will of the person, even though external pressures for such change are strong. It is contended here that the cultural style of the learner is an important factor to take into account in any learning process. It is argued that the practical subjective preferences manifested in everyday life are always places to start the learning process in spite of the fact that the subject might be a violent actor in that context.

The voice of all learners in the dialogical process is therefore necessary in peace education. These voices blend into a chorus of dialogical communications. Most false tones in this chorus will hopefully sooner or later be corrected in the educational process. Some may remain, hopefully without dominating the dialogical harmony. Dialogical learning (Freire 1972: 45–9) is characterized by codification and de-codification processes in which the world of practice in everyday life is put on the agenda for discussion in the educational interactions. This discussion may reveal challenges of everyday life that become themes for further dialogue. The description of a learner’s own reality is codified by the teacher in order that the learner may then de-codify the teacher’s attempt at mirroring the discussion. If accepted by the learners, the description or theory coming from the participants themselves and codified by the teacher may become a critical light on the initial practice so that this practice is transformed to another practice based on the insights of the initial discussions. This transformation from practice to praxis implies that the practical world of everyday life has been understood in a theoretical light coming from the discussions of the participants themselves and accepted as a guide for changes in everyday life. If the codification is not accepted, a new dialogue takes place in order to arrive at a better insight into the world of everyday life and its possible transformation.

Figure 18.2 has the form of a large arrow. This illustrates the continuous development of dialectics between theory and practice – it is never static. The numbers illustrate the different




Figure 18.2. The dialectics between theory and practice

phases in this development. The number 1 signifies the first phase in the dialogical process. In this phase the initial meeting of the group and its teacher/facilitator/coordinator takes place in order to select the generative theme for continued content development. The discussion about a generative theme constitutes the materials to be used in the teacher's codification (C). The codification represents a bridge between the concrete and the abstract. In the de-codification (D), the more abstract description of the practice or initial theoretical understanding of the practice is tested in reference to that part of the empirical reality that is known to the participant. At this stage the theory may be changed, some subjective perceptions accepted and others refused. After a new phase of codification new de-codifications follow. C and D are positioned in the middle between the two lines illustrating theory and practice. The distance between the two processes of codification and de-codification, as well as between theory and practice, is dependent upon many things – not the least of which is how far the participants have reached in the development of theory starting from their own practice.

The process of development of theories departing from social practices – codification – and returning to practices with new knowledge from theory – de-codification – in order to apply and enrich the reality in a new turn leads Paulo Freire to define education as a practice of freedom. Freedom of practices, freedom of thinking and freedom to build interconnections in order to create new thoughts in a transformative path. And so works peace education.

Peace education would be – as well – a liberalizing process in which people – not as recipients but as knowing subjects – achieve a deepening awareness both of the sociocultural reality which shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform that reality. Hence peace education would be a practice of freedom and not domination – also a conscious act, one of choosing rather than one of being given – an act of cognition rather than mere transfer of information.

Peace education is also a dialogical act – at the same time rigorous, intuitive, imaginative and emotional. The educational process has to create conditions for horizontal dialogue; but dialogue applied towards the concept of pedagogic strategy. It is a truth criterion and it includes communication and intercommunication. Dialogue is not only a generous act of human understanding of the other. It is an ontological and epistemological need for knowing the truth and searching with the others. Peace education needs a dialogical, communicative rationality and the acts of knowing and thinking are directly tied to one another as knowledge requires communicative expression (Morrow and Torres 2004: 69). Dialogue does not exclude the conflict as truth does not come from the conformation of my vision with the vision of 'the other'. Confronting other visions, it is necessary to arrive at the common understanding of problems and building solutions. This confrontation does not mean that dialogue within those who think and dream differently has to be divided or segregated. There is no democratic growth in society, no civic learning – therefore no peace learning – without the co-habitation of different groups enjoying the same rights. Rights to struggle for their dreams and hopes interacting with others with different dreams and hopes in a challenging process of 'crossing borders' in an individual and collective dimension (Giroux 1997).

If dialogue is the main form in which peace education builds knowledge and understanding as a learning process for approaching contents and 'the others', participation is the practice by which this dialogue is embedded along the whole process.

Participation is a fundamental right of citizenship, the means by which a democracy is built and a standard against which democracies should be measured. Participation means that all the groups of society (the whole) are able and are invited to gather, to discuss and to exchange ideas not only in policy-making decisions but also in planning issues related to their daily life, needs and hopes. They should be able to plan and decide their learning themes and issues according to their needs and realities, which is to say, according to their contextual conditions.

So in a way contextual conditions ‘dictate’ the themes and at the same time ‘condition’ the themes for analysis, discussion and research. In this process, the passing from ‘silent-voting objects’ to ‘participative subjects’ is a pre-condition for the development of a democratic society with rights to all and duties to accomplish (Cabezudo forthcoming).

So the participative component of the peace learning process is also a practice of freedom itself, and a praxis where reflection and action occur.

This process initiated as a participative one through dialogical communication (see Figure 18.2 – position 1) implies the ability to detach oneself from reality and look at it critically – codification. This process is to be followed by de-codification – the ability to envision possible futures and possible strategies for social change. The ability to think about one’s situation with an eye on social change is crucial for peace education.

Therefore peace education by applying processes of codification and de-codification in its methodology comes to be a training for critical thinking itself.

Man has the capacity to look at reality critically through a process of detachment for which man is endowed. If we adapted this to peace education, we would say that it is a challenge to the human being to recognize and analyze the causes of discord, the conditions of personal and structural violence and to search for possibilities to bring about change. Trying to relate the issue of peace to the experience of people is useless unless it is preceded by an effort to build certain tools which will enable them to lead a critical process for understanding and creating alternatives, which means reinstall hope in societies.

The peace learning process creates a space for meeting, for talking about common issues and problems, as well as challenging the actors in this process to find new ideas tackling borders by confronting solutions for their individual and collective hopes–needs–dreams.

The practice of dialogic communication and participatory decision involves a collective democratic process. And this is one of the main goals in peace education.

On content and form in peace education

As it has been discussed here, peace education is not just concerned with different concepts of peace and what you teach but also with how you teach and the contextual conditions within which you teach. In fact, there is a desirable unity between the content, the form and the context where the learning process takes place.

If peace education is the pedagogy that has to deal with the goal of change in order to set up an education that does not reproduce the system but envisions social transformation, it is evident that content and form are linked components of its substance where changes have to be made. At the same time, they would produce changes in the contextual conditions due to their dialectical dynamics.

Hence it is highly possible that peace education might improve the reality through its practice as an alternative pedagogy. A conceptual view that is based on the critical pedagogical understanding of knowledge as a social product – legitimated and distributed – that expresses particular interests and values – is never ‘objective’ per nature. So the role of practices is fundamental in feeding theories and building new actions where these theories can be contrasted and rebuilt.

According to this assumption educators would be forced to confront the relation between knowledge, power and control and include transformative action in their practices. These

pedagogical practices should offer procedures for reflexive consciousness raising and demystification of the officially handed-down discourse. Figure 18.2, previously depicted, shows how this process occurs.

Often contents are selected and presented as abstract structures with obscure concepts, and with poor contact with daily life and real problems. A structure with its own codes for selected chosen people – the only ones able to de-codify the meanings for others – who depend on ‘de-codification experts’ in order to understand ‘the world’, the society, the reality . . . no matter if it is close or far.

Peace education contents will not start from abstract categories but from people’s needs, captured in their own expressions. The traditional concept of content as a summing up of different themes is replaced by the analysis of micro-reality, the selection of problems, connections with the macro and the emerged dialogue among them. So in the learning process students deepen into roots and causes and share ideas on possible solutions in a dynamic exercise of ‘crossing borders’. Gender, class, ethnic, religious, social-economic and cultural differences will flow through dialogue, will be part of the discussed problems – and at the same time part of the solution.

According to this process to know is not to accumulate knowledge, information or data regarding certain themes or problems only. To know implies everyday knowledge, taking care of small things and thinking about the local and the global in a linked understanding so that the outer world will be part of everyday life as well. (See the earlier section on the relationships between the micro and the macro.) There is no division within instructive significance and everyday educative significance. It is the everyday knowledge of the social group that incorporates individual and collective ‘learnings and understandings’. And while people incorporate knowledge through dialogue, other meanings are incorporated such as ‘how we know’, ‘how we produce knowledge’ and ‘how society uses knowledge’. To know is also changing attitudes, learning to think critically, establishing relationships and creating links.

This learning process would depart from collective discussions on significative themes for people, would continue searching for solutions to close problems with a reference to macro structures, use existing practices as useful background and try to shape solutions as a reflective social construction – the praxis.

The links within form and content are evident. The way dialogue is created and themes are selected builds a particular dynamic that feeds and enriches both. Hence peace learning acquires a particular significance itself as a dimension of a transformative tool for change in all the actors of this process, not only in their own ‘insides’ but also for their potential ‘outside’ actions – in the closer and far realities.

Content becomes form, in a way form is the content. And both – acting as agents for change – have the powerful chance – the challenge – to transform contextual conditions.

On contextual conditions

Important assumptions underlying peace education initiatives need to be discussed critically in light of the realization that the whats, hows and whys of peace learning are all problematic in that there is no absolute answer to be found without reference to the contexts in which learners live their lives and how these contexts relate to the outside world. The experience of living provides the learner with the possibility of ‘reading the world’ so that they can: (1) observe and diagnose violence (physical, structural, cultural) in their own context and in its external

relations to other contexts; (2) search for root causes of such violence, both internal to (including the self) and external to their own context; (3) formulate visions of nonviolent alternative futures; (4) reflect upon appropriate means of change; and (5) act with skill towards the creation of new peace processes and buildings. Let these five components serve as an informal guide on how a peace education process directs learners from an initial point of observation and diagnosis of violence towards practical actions in order to transform that reality to peace and nonviolence.

Important contextual conditions for peace education comprise the types and levels of violence manifested in the context and how that violence is caused by both micro- and macro-forces as explained in the time-space diagram. Contextual conditions also relate to the possibilities present for transcendence of violence involving the development of desirable visions of the future and possibilities for action, for transforming present violence to nonviolent futures. Contextual conditions are therefore both internal and external to the context. In reference to the above discussion about the relationships between micro and macro, contextual conditions may be seen as both internal and external at the same time.

This reflects a main idea in Bourdieu's (1984) theory: the habitus of the human being and objective and material structures in the larger society seek harmony. This means that the lifestyle and personality of each human being has been influenced by the outside world at the same time as the human being is challenged to transform the outside world to fit cultural preferences. This force towards harmony between cultural expressions or lifestyles and the outside world makes changes in both habitus and the outside world possible.

Contextual conditions relate to micro- as well as macro-realities. Such realities can be described in terms of social, political, cultural and economic aspects and how these relate to each other. Understanding contextual conditions therefore involves nothing less than understanding both micros and macros and their relationships. This means beginning to develop an understanding of the relationships between close and distant realities and how different forms of violence at different levels interact in space and time. To develop a conception of this is a requirement for finding effective spaces for new interactions in the peace process.

A highly relevant part of contextual conditions would be the educational policies selected by the authorities. The formal education system in most countries is characterized by division of knowledge into specific subjects, teachers with specific competencies in these subjects, the grouping of students into classes and the division of time into periods and breaks. These basic characteristics – others could be added such as evaluation procedures and discipline codes – are important structural components, which allow for certain types of initiatives for introducing peace education into the curriculum and exclude other types. Thus, curriculum preferences may make it possible to change the content of a specific subject in such a way that it would deal more with peace issues. Such change in the content might not have any significance for the other components, such as the methods employed, the division of knowledge into subjects and the division of time into periods and breaks.

If, however, the form of education is regarded as a problem, as well as the way knowledge has been divided into subjects, the peace educator runs into other problems of a structural nature, i.e. the peace education project might contradict the basic characteristics of the structure in which it is introduced. If, for instance, a peace education project is based on the principles of problem orientation and participatory decision making it could not, without problems, be introduced into a school system which rigidly practises the division into subjects, classes and periods.

It would be extremely difficult to realize problem-oriented and participatory education

through a prescribed plan for a subject, carried out by a teacher in a rigidly structured classroom situation with 30 students, in periods of 45 minutes each. Apart from the rigidity imposed by these three components (subject, class, time), the greatest barrier for peace education projects might be the rules laid down in educational systems concerning evaluation of the students, through which students are sorted into categories according to their achievement in school subjects focusing on what is known but not on what is not known.

Through this discussion about contextual conditions with examples from the structure of the formal school system, it should be clear that a peace education project might be in harmony or disharmony with it. Therefore, it is possible that so many disharmonies exist that the structure itself must be changed before peace education can be introduced.

The question then arises whether the structure can be changed through changes in form and content, or whether this is impossible until changes are brought about in the contextual conditions in society, which has produced the educational structure.

On content, form and contextual conditions

The analysis of how structure can be changed through form and content or whether structure can be transformed after changes if contextual conditions occur leads the discussion to a consideration of *the appropriate scenario* for this process; that is to say, a scenario to develop peace education in desirable conditions. These conditions should privilege dialogical form, allow discussion on contents by all the actors engaged in the learning process and build critical thinking. Simultaneously actors should develop practice in reality by operative and practical actions.

This scenario is without any doubt that of democracy – at micro- and macro-level – where guarantees for freedom of thinking and action help the start of transformative processes at individual and collective level. Therefore a question arises immediately on what is the substance of democracy related to peace education (Gadotti 2004)

Let us discuss it in a macro-framework first. A democratic scenario for transformation means a scenario where a ‘civilizing process’ can be developed in contradiction to the ‘uncivilizing process’ characterized today by the erosion of legitimacy of political authority, combined with the impact of globalization and the emergence of powerful transnational economic forces. This kind of scenario originates an explosive combination in the creation of structural and cultural violence with linked consequences on direct violence. Contextual conditions do not help peace learning – content and form reflect this non-peaceful environment – and the emerged interactions probably create a new spiral of violence (Kaldor and Luckham 2001: 52–7).

The key to building a democratic peace – that is to say, desirable contextual conditions for peace learning – is to break through the vicious cycle of violence and to reconstruct relations based on dialogue, agreed rules and mutual understanding. Ending violence is very difficult without democratization of structures and it is a huge challenge for peace education to consider that isolated changes on content and form within certain contextual conditions would provoke transformation itself.

Many times democratic contextual conditions are not present *and change happens all the same*. Certainly it was not in the space of the formal system – that reproduces goals, subjectivities and policies of the macro political structure – but in the diverse spaces of the non formal and informal learning settings. Having in mind peace education goals, non-formal and informal agendas goes across almost every issue, showing a tension between explicit and hidden sides and enriching the possibilities of learning and developing concepts/practical skills in ‘real life

situations', which means learning in the broadest sense of the word. The search for a harmonious interaction within formal, non-formal and informal education is one of the most difficult challenges for education and certainly an issue that must be considered very seriously in the field of peace education. A pedagogic attempt to explore, analyze, study and search for possibilities to solve this complicated link related to our field is a contemporary issue that needs to be accomplished.

Non-formal and informal learning challenge structures by creating opportunities for skipping the 'rules' of non-democratic formal systems and allowing them to build peace and nonviolent learning as ways of resistance through creativity and imagination. These learnings will confront non-democratic, hard realities by developing liberatory strategies rooted in social and collective experiences and actions.

Non-formal and informal education bring alternative spaces for peace learning when a specific context created by structures does not allow the development of free and critical thinking through constructive autonomous procedures. The process of learning and exchanging knowledge as a social practice is one of the most important means non-formal and informal education offer to peace education. And the potential of its strength was challenged many times under non-democratic contexts resulting in transformative social learnings. Social practices and learnings created in this process operate as a tool for resistance in those contextual conditions where education is manipulated, denying critical thinking, emancipation and freedom.

Peace education in non-formal contexts considered as a strategy and a tool for resistance departs from the assumption that: (a) education is a social production and not merely knowledge transmission; (b) education for freedom is a precondition to a democratic life – meaning a life with autonomy, sovereignty and real decision-making power in daily life; and (c) education implies refusal of authoritarianism, manipulation, hierarchical relationships and exacerbation of power control ideology from specific individuals/groups over others (Cabezudo forthcoming).

Resistance is the path and the way to promote transformation in violent contexts where those conditions do not allow change or actions towards change. The Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Adolfo Perez Esquivel described the concept of resistance as a 'state of consciousness' (Perez Esquivel 2004) that strengthens work in difficult contextual conditions where violence prevails; a state of consciousness that leads to active participation within close or far realities creating new social conditions through practice.

When contextual conditions block positive changes in society, collective and individual resistance operates as a motto that feeds actions and works as a strategic tool towards transformation. Departing from difficult – often violent – 'presents' dreams and visions on diverse 'futures' helps to lead concrete transformative actions into reality and pave the way to liberation. Isn't this a practical peace learning?

Resistance is also a collective strategy for being seen and heard in circumstances when the context is not interested or does not allow certain people/groups/problems to be seen or discussed at social or political levels. Resistance has been the path, as well, that led many countries to freedom and democracy like South Africa and most of the present Latin American republics. Latin-American contextual conditions along the 'wave' of dictatorships between 1960 and 1985 are a model sample of how non-formal education assumes peace learning when the formal system turns back. During this period the rule of law disappeared; civil, political and social freedoms did not exist. Peoples from almost all countries of the continent – Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru – lived under the horror of being kidnapped, murdered or tortured due to their beliefs, their hopes or their dreams for justice and social change. In Central America and Colombia, the same period was characterized by 'open

war' within national parties. The whole region was opposite to a desirable scenario where contextual conditions would produce transformation and change. The formal system – functional to the macro political structure – turned schools, universities, colleges and teachers into reproductive tools of the dominant ideology.

But change occurs . . . People understood those contextual conditions *as a challenge and not as a defeat*. People reacted against 'domestication' of their lives by 'others' in a certain space and time – the place where they live and the time where they live. They reacted to contextual conditions where the future is manipulated in a predetermined way. The future is something inexorable – something that will necessarily occur but decided by 'others'. In refusing the domestication of time and space, the importance of the role of subjectivity in history was recognized. Therefore challenges for change broke fixed a priori concepts of possible 'defeats', and visions of hope and nonviolent contexts prevailed. Inexorable futures handled by obscure forces were transformed into desirable futures towards which society struggles (Cabezudo forthcoming). Isn't this a peace learning lesson?

On this assumption non-formal and informal education settings brought the spaces where nonviolent and peace actions at micro-level could work as alternatives. Those alternatives were built in 'non-domesticated places and times' confronting hard macro-contextual conditions in a devastating struggle for autonomy, freedom and democracy.

A true struggle for peace against structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1998).

Along with this process social movements, civil organizations and individuals develop resistance – nonviolent forms in communication and action. These forms reach other people's minds and souls and society/individuals shape collective visions for change that with time will become realities and not merely utopian 'futures'.

Resistance works and it is a peace learning process interesting to study and research in other contextual conditions different to those exemplified here by the Latin American case.

After dictatorships the process of democratization works out as an educative path in which the transformation of contextual conditions – due to the passing from dictatorships to democracies – brings changes in the ways of thinking, acting and reconstructing the reality. This process is a good example of how context interacted with content and form in terms of transformation. Internal and external conditions flowed from the democratization process breaking pre-existent structures and 'liberating' people at individual and collective level. Therefore these internal and external 'new' contextual conditions strengthen processes of economic and social change.

Formal systems and peace education have to take good note of these kind of processes as educative and transformative strategies for their own disciplinary fields.

Working on a micro- or macro-level, the centrepiece of any peace strategy has to be the restoration of trust and confidence in ourselves and towards others. It has to counteract fear and hate with a strategy of hearts and minds. Contextual conditions have very much to do with this. It should be stressed, however, that any such strategy is very difficult and likely to be of long duration. Education and peace education is a long-term process whose goals will be accomplished in realities sometimes rather far from the departing point.

Therefore if we think of education as a continuum of practices in reflection and action producing daily-life praxis and building knowledge by ourselves and with others, it does not matter when we achieve the prescribed goals. What matters is the process itself and the significance of its path. What matters indeed is the development of critical thinking, the analysis and discussion of problems, and how new alternatives are created in a democratic process. At the same time, the dynamics of the process itself provoke changes in contextual conditions.

The transformative condition in the substance of peace education has moved from a potential to a real-world status setting, changing and creating new ways of thinking and acting.

Peace education is a tool for transforming internal–external contextual conditions and building – at the same time – a liberatory and creative process in both dimensions.

Peace education as a transformative social process in democracy

We have noted that peace education in a democratic social system would develop successful processes which would bring it to a state which is to be attained and maintained. Democracy and peace education as a whole learning participatory process takes place at both social and individual levels. Democracy is not confined only to the way the state exercises its power and to citizens' participation. It is also the way people communicate with each other in the family, at school, within association groups, as well as religious or ethnic communities and society as a whole. Early socialization through family interaction and local educational policies promoting active dialogue and participation creates a democratic atmosphere for a transformative process in education. The correct application of the representative democratic systems and the participatory democracy model as well as the strategies of participatory budgeting in the development of public policies open spaces to reflect on new perspectives of the concept of peace education related to democracy and its capacity to build transformation at social and political levels working on individual and social grounds.

Peace education has to identify appropriate teaching–learning activities, new contents and transformative strategies for the settlement of peace learning pedagogies coming from political and social praxis as well as new tools and forms developed in non–formal practices.

With this picture in mind, peace education is a suitable field for discussing and selecting, in a dynamic way, a whole kit of contents to develop alternatives for transforming violence and conflictive situations. It is – as well – the field for practising dialogue as a basic form of communication. Dialogical democratic form as peace learning praxis. Peace education – like true democracy – has an inclusive view of who in the community should be involved in the decision–making process. Room is made for every person's input and interaction. Participation is not mandatory but expected and provided for. Responsibility then lies with the individual to take advantage of a political peaceful process designed to make participation by the ordinary citizen as easy as possible.

Assuming education as practice for freedom, the concepts of democracy and peace education appear complementary in the sense that they work in a dynamic synergy facing the risk – and the challenge – of crossing borders 'for reading the world' – the micro and macro worlds – more completely. Inviting social actors – the whole population – in different spaces of formal and non–formal education to reflect and act over structural and cultural violence.

Borders are always surrounding us. Academics and educators who occupy very narrow borders do not realize that they also have the capacity to capture and block our minds for better understanding. Many times borders work as mechanisms of structural and cultural violence at macro–level and micro–contextual experience (see Figure 18.1).

We assume here peace education as a learning process that would allow the linking of interactions crossing borders towards direct and structural violence as well as cultural confrontation or misunderstandings. According to this assumption the practice of dialogue and participation in democratic structures work as strategic tools for change, transformation and more justice.

Hence the generation of conditions for peace education; in other words, the building of this capacity in the social system, is the primary task of democratic public policies related to the educational field. This might be a main issue in the agenda of democratic governments since it aims to identify the conditions to be attained and proposes criteria of evaluation that will assist in the preparation of a plan for action and follow-up for the creation and strengthening of peace education programmes in the formal system and non-formal policies.

In such terms, peace education and peace learning ceases to be a theoretical dissertation of a vague purpose, and it acquires the dimension of an action plan, with the possibility that goals can be defined by it, results evaluated by qualitative methods and status constantly monitored, so that alarm bells will ring when the condition in which it takes place is not secured.

Based on the lessons learned particularly from African and Latin American contexts, it is assumed that democratic social systems have the conditions to make their purposes viable as a whole and in each particular project. The process is part of an objective and contributes to it, if there are individuals or organizations with the capacity to influence society as a whole, if the strategic actors use their capacities positively, if individuals take part in the various stages of the process and if the process has a positive effect on the transformation and change of society.

In sum, to develop peace education as a transformative process in democracy certain requirements must be met:

- The construction of a collective vision of nonviolent and transformative development which reflects some collective purpose to be achieved and which stimulates a large rank of social actors.
- The recognition of individual or collective leadership with the capacity to call upon the commitments of society to the promoted educational process.
- The development of constructive relations between actors committed to the process. The importance of the identification of the actors, their roles and their potential contributions presupposes a precise definition of how the public and private national and sub-national factors of power interact, the obtaining of consensus, legitimacy and leadership.
- The building of institutional capacity to ensure that the public policy required by a peace education process – formal and non formal – is effective. This aims to deepen discussion of the instruments of administrative efficiency, transparency in public administration, innovative practices and financial sustainability of experiences.
- Civic participation in the various steps of the peace education planning and ongoing process. With due regard to the importance of democratic governance, it will be necessary to define its scope and especially its status as a tool. There need to be definitions and discussions of the risks of applying it, the way in which those risks can be faced and its limitations.
- The obtaining of results through indicators which reflect transformation towards non-violent conditions, collective learnings and changes within societies where the process of peace education and peace learning takes place.

The notion of building and practising peace learning in democratic environments entails the notion of a democratic citizenship where social actors are responsible and able to participate, choose their representatives and monitor their performance. These are not only political but also peace learning pedagogical practices. The construction of a democratic citizen implies the construction as well of a pedagogic subject committed to nonviolent practices and peaceful means ready to interact with others and with the close/far reality. And this process of construction of the democratic pedagogic subject – individual or collective – is not only a process of

cultural nurturing, but it also involves principles of pedagogic and democratic socialization where peace education has a vital role to accomplish.

How is the constitution of this pedagogical democratic subject related to peace learning processes? How do the content, form and contextual conditions on which this process occurs affect the constitution of a peaceful democratic subject open to transformation, solidarity and change by nonviolent means?

This is the dilemma of the present world and present time. Here and now.

And this is the main question we have tried to discuss and reflect on in this chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter has intended to explore the substance of peace education and its nature as it is essentially political in the sense that it calls for the analysis of power and authority within the structures and processes. In other words, peace education and the praxis and learning that it entails, is a challenge across genders, generations and cultures and an important part of life-long learning. Peace education – peace learning – takes place in informal, non-formal and formal settings. It involves cultural action for peace and this organic set of actions helps shape the way in which peace is defined and generated in different contexts.

Even in those situations where conflict is not evidently present, the dynamics and interaction generated from living together in harmony are a lesson we have to underline and learn as a wise peace education praxis. It is therefore evident that we need peace-minded leadership and vision, but such leadership can only be effective and sustainable if public opinion supports and actively promotes the visions and strategies that make peace real and nearer. This requires that we look at the transformation of conflicts through peaceful means. This, in turn, requires a dialogically-oriented praxis, and a peace learning approach by all actors directly involved in the transformation, as well as actors who are marginal to the epicentres of direct violence.

Peace education should help build visions of peaceful futures in a world in which diversity and plurality can be celebrated without fear and threat. These visions need to be realistic enough so that it is possible to find the road map to the vision and as that road may be long or short it would have certain milestones along the way for verifying that the direction is correct. But as we have pointed out, no diagnosis, no vision and no road map would be sufficient if all of this reflection is not combined with action founded on a conception of the knowledge that we have summed up in the concept of praxis. Without the realization of this combination of reflection and action it is believed that peace education would end up in either verbalism or activism.

The main goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how peace education can contribute to the process of change at the micro- and macro-level by developing critical thinking, dialogue across borders, social attitudes favouring voluntary restraints on the use of force, settlement of disputes without resorting to direct violence, acceptance of the rule of law and multicultural understanding.

The challenge to peace education is not to adapt to contextual conditions that contribute to violence but to develop knowledge supporting alternatives to violence, whether that happens in formal, informal or non-formal education. A state may leave few options for the selection of both content and form in peace education in the formal education system. A state may choose to control the non-formal sector. But so far no state has been able to control informal education in the everyday life of family and friends. And under the most violent conditions the power of

the people has been effective in the struggle for their rights and envisioned world of hope and justice. The knowledge, processes, strategies and mechanisms through which this struggle towards a more desirable world finds its form and the transformative consequences of actions taken – praxis – is the main content of peace education in the present world.

This chapter has intended to demonstrate that an alternative peaceful future is defined not only as the absence of open hostilities or negative peace but as the presence of peacemaking processes and contextual conditions likely to ensure a durable, just and positive peace. It implies a state of well-being, a dynamic social process in which justice, equity and respect for basic human rights are maximized and violence, both physical and structural, is minimized.

Peace education will not achieve the changes necessary for peace. Rather, it prepares learners to achieve the changes. It aims at developing awareness of social and political responsibilities, guiding and challenging people to develop their own learning from individual and collective actions. It encourages them to explore possibilities for their own contribution to resolving the problems and achieving better conditions for living their lives by themselves and with others.

The approach to peace education in this chapter has emphasized a critical dimension, questioning existing structures, power, norms and educational values. While we were aware of the limitations of peace education, we have seen that it arouses hope by demonstrating that people are capable of acquiring the required skills and by illuminating creative learning moments.

Peace education can definitively help to provide the requisite inspiration and direction to move beyond a culture of violence to envisioning and working toward a better world for all.

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